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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis investigates the recent world-wide rise in Islamic banking.  In doing so 
it (1) surveys the underlying religious foundation of Islamic finance, (2) examines the 
attempts of Islamists to use Islamic banking to Islamize societies, and (3) assesses how 
countries’ use of Islamic banking fit into the international economic system.  Drawing on 
this analysis, Islamic banking is finally examined from a national security perspective – is 
this form of finance particularly susceptible to miss-use by terrorist groups? Although 
there are areas in the industry that need regulating and monitoring, this study ultimately 
concludes that Islamic banking’s ties to terrorism are anecdotal, the expansion is the 
result of oil revenues and personal piety, and that Islamic banking can be leveraged as a 
means of moderation and enfranchisement when advanced free of an Islamist agenda. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK...............................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN.....................................................................................1 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................1 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE.....................................................................................8 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE .........................................................9 
A. THE FOUNDATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE ........................................10 
B. THE BEGINNING OF AN ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM................14 
C. THE CREATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS............19 
D. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS..................................................26 
1. Musharaka..........................................................................................27 
2. Mudaraba ...........................................................................................28 
3. Murabaha ...........................................................................................29 
4. Ijara.....................................................................................................31 
5. Salam and Istisna’..............................................................................32 
6. Sukuk ..................................................................................................33 
III. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ISLAMIC BANKING ......................................35 
A. STRUCTURE OF AN ISLAMIC BANK ....................................................36 
B. ISLAMIC BANING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA..........................................................................................................38 




C. ISLAMIC BANKING IN ASIA....................................................................43 
1. Malaysia ..............................................................................................43 
2. Indonesia.............................................................................................46 
3. Pakistan...............................................................................................48 
D. ISLAMIC BANKING IN THE WEST ........................................................50 
1. The United Kingdom .........................................................................50 
2. The United States ...............................................................................52 
IV. LIABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES .................................................................55 
A. ENHANCED FINANCIAL STABILITY ....................................................55 
B. CRITICISM AND CONCERNS ..................................................................56 
1. Incongruent Goals and Results.........................................................56 
2. Islamic Moral Hazard........................................................................57 
3. Arbitrage and Innovation..................................................................58 
4. Operating in a Conventional International System........................60 
5. Regulations and Organizations.........................................................61 
C. ISLAMIC BANKING AND ISLAMISM ....................................................66 
 viii
1. Kuwait Finance House.......................................................................68 
2. Jordan Islamic Bank..........................................................................70 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................73 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................77 




 I would like to extend sincere appreciation to Dr. Robert Looney and Dr. Abbas 
Kadhim for all of their guidance and inspiration.  I owe a debt of gratitude to the faculty 
and staff of the NSA department and the Dudley Knox Library for their unwavering 
support during this endeavor.  I must also recognize the United States Navy for giving me 
the opportunity to further advance my education.  Most of all, I would like to thank my 
wife Adlin for all of the patience, support, and love.  Al-hamdu lillāh. 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A. PURPOSE 
Islamic banking operates under a cloud of suspicion, from being accused of 
knowingly financing terrorist operations to questions of its inherent structural 
susceptibility for such use.  Once viewed as a specialized financial oddity due to its 
prohibition of interest, Islamic finance is now over a $400 billion industry that is 
projected to grow between 10 to 15 percent a year.  Islamic banks have been tied to 
terrorist organizations through various Islamic charities, feeding the fear that the raison 
d’etre of Islamic banking is the financing of Islamic terrorism.  This brings the following 
question: Is the Islamic banking industry growing to finance Islamic terrorist 
organizations or are factors such as an increase in oil revenues in the Persian Gulf States 
and a religious reawakening in the Muslim world creating a demand for shari’a-
compliant banking and investment opportunities? 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 In attempting to answer this question, a review of the current literature relating 
Islamic banking to terrorism was conducted.  This was followed by an analysis of the 
current banking operations, taking into consideration the historical foundations and 
regional differences, looking for inherent weaknesses and opportunities for exploitation 
by nefarious elements.  Conclusions were based on the liabilities and opportunities 
associated with Islamic banking discovered during the process. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature that supports the industry’s ties to terrorism seems to be anecdotal 
at best, comprising isolated incidents.  Napoleoni asserts that there is collusion among 
Islamic banks, legitimate business, and Islamic charities in financing terrorism.   She cites 
the Arab Bank as the financial arm of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  
With a strong presence in Jordan that comprised 70 percent of its national economy by 
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the 1980s, the Arab Bank, primarily through the Arab Bank for Economic Development 
and the Arab African Bank, managed the PLO’s capital outflow into other countries.  
Hamas, which grew out of the First Intifada, used the Al-Aqsa International Bank as its 
financial arm.  Hamas received funding from the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development (HLF), a charity that collected funds for the Palestinian occupied 
territories, and used Bayt al-Mal Holdings for construction work.  Although authorities 
closed these three organizations in December 2001, Hamas continues to receive funding 
through charities, though it is careful not to use these funds for military activities, and the 
Arab Bank is still in operation, but it is not an Islamic bank.1 
Napoleoni continues with describing Islamic banks’ role in investing in 
developing countries in exchange for permission to build mosques and deploy Islamic 
charitable organizations to the countries, some of the latter ultimately being associated 
with Osama bin Laden’s group.  Specifically, Islamic banking made inroads into Africa, 
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  She 
argues that this expansion of influence of Islamic financial and economic institutions 
assisted in the proliferation of armed Islamist groups and gave birth to a globalized terror 
economy.2  She focuses on Saudi Arabia’s use of Islamic banking as a means of 
spreading Wahabi Islam.  Bin Laden had used a subsidiary of the Saudi-sponsored Dar 
al-Maal al-Islami (DMI) Islamic bank, ash-Shamil Islamic bank in Sudan, along with the 
Tadamon Islamic Bank and the Faisal Islamic Bank for transferring money to his 
international operatives.3   
Islamic banks are involved in collecting the religious tax of zakat, essentially a 
two percent tithe, and distributing it to charities.  The depositors have no control over 
which charities receive the funds, and some of them have had ties to Islamic terrorist 
organizations.4  Although Napoleoni claims that zakat is taken out with every transaction, 
                                                 
1 Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (Sterling, VA: 
Pluto Press 2003), 68-72. 
2 Ibid., 109. 
3 Ibid., 119-120. 
4 Ibid., 120-123. 
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this is not necessarily the case, the frequency of deduction being at the depositor’s 
discretion.  Napoleoni also discusses the informal hawala system as a means of 
transferring money, an efficient and practically untraceable tool used by millions of 
Asian and African immigrants, and often the only “banking” system in failed and failing 
countries.  Terrorists find the system appealing for its secrecy and speed of transactions.5  
Hawala, though widely used in Muslim societies, is not a part of Islamic banking. 
Although Napoleoni makes an interesting argument regarding Islamic banking’s 
inherent proclivity for financing terrorism, she tends to gloss over the fact that 
conventional banks were also used in financing al-Qaeda terror campaigns.  Conventional 
correspondent banks that receive money from a third bank can weaken the vetting system 
of the respondent bank,6 a tactic she fails to discuss.  She also discounts the element of 
piety that is behind the spread of Islamic banking, many banks filling a demand by 
Muslims for shari’a-compliant banking options.  Like many of the authors, Napoleoni 
tends to imply sweeping generalizations about the Islamic banking industry based on a 
few isolated incidents. 
Comras discusses al-Qaeda’s use of operating its own businesses as a source of 
funding their terrorist activities, individual cells being responsible for their own 
financing, and the migration from using established banking systems to more informal 
methods like hawala to make international financial transactions.  In discussing al-Qaeda 
and its sympathizers using their own businesses to raise money for their operations, 
Comras mentions Al-Hamati Sweet Bakeries and two honey businesses, An-Nur Honey 
Press Shops and Ash-Shifa Honey Press for Industry and Commerce, all still in operation.  
He also names such shell corporations as Wadi al-Aqiq, Laden International Company, 
and Taba investment.  Although the Sudanese government closed these businesses in 
1998 with the expulsion of al-Qaeda, there is reason to believe that these companies, and 
others like them, may possess assets in many other parts of the world.7 
                                                 
5 Napoleoni, 123-125. 
6 “Correspondent Banks, the Weakest Links,” Economist, 29 September 2001. 
7 Victor Comras, “Al-Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” in Terrorism Financing and 
State Responses, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007), 
123-124. 
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The defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan destroyed the pre-9/11 network of al-
Qaeda, the result being that al-Qaeda’s shura, or high command council, no longer 
manages the solicitation or allocation of funds.  Compartmentalized, autonomous cells 
have assumed the responsibility of financing their own operations, utilizing local 
businesses, charity, and petty crime to raise funds.8 
Although al-Qaeda used the international banking system for many of its financial 
transactions, maintaining accounts in numerous international banking centers including 
Europe and North America, the regulatory doctrines adopted after the 9/11 attacks drove 
al-Qaeda away from this system to more informal methods.  In spite of this change, 
however, the financiers, businesses, and charities financing al-Qaeda “continue to make 
careful and prudent use of the international banking system.”9  In addition, al-Qaeda’s 
facilitators had established their own banking networks, such as Al-Barakaat and at-
Taqwa, for covert financial transactions, although the 9/11 Commission exonerated Al-
Barakaat, primarily a hawala operator, after it was accused of complicity in the attacks.10  
Even though Comras cites at-Taqwa’s suspected ties to al-Qaeda, he does not conclude 
that it is associated with the terrorist group because of the bank’s Islamic classification.  
Al-Qaeda has utilized a variety of conventional, non-Islamic sources in financing its 
operations. 
Kepel argues that Islamist11 groups like the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to 
the establishment of Islamic banks “that would eventually finance the militant Islamist 
movement.”12  He describes the Islamic financial system as linking the tribal aristocracy 
of the Arabian Peninsula, guardians and beneficiary of the region’s oil endowment, with 
the pious middle class, resulting in an economic partnership that satisfied the 
                                                 
8 Comras, 126 
9 Ibid., 126-127. 
10 Ibid., 127-128. 
11 In this thesis, Islamism is defined as the use of Islam in politics and civil governance to varying 
degrees, from merely a declared influence to strict application of Islamic law, dependent upon the goals of 
the Islamist group.  Some consider Islamism to be the most fundamental interpretation of Islamism and the 
strictest application of shari’a, often at the expense of democracy.  This debate is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
12 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), 51. 
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aristocracy’s need for pious legitimacy.13  This transnational Muslim middle class, whose 
piety had grown with its wealth from working in the booming oil economies of the 1970s, 
was looking for Islamic-compliant investment opportunities that would be sheltered from 
the feared financial shenanigans practiced by its countries’ government-controlled state 
banks.  Kepel contends that the radical Islamists viewed these Islamic financial 
institutions as a place beyond the reach of established regimes to accumulate the funds 
that would ultimately be used to topple these regimes.  He further contends that this new 
banking system was one of the most important factors for the expansion of Islamism in 
the middle class during the 1980s.14 
El-Gamal argues that Islamic finance can fall victim to rent-seeking legal 
arbitrage by contemporary Islamic banks using premodern contract forms in the name of 
Islamicity.  Such manipulations result in significant efficiency losses and undermine the 
economic purposes for which these contracts forms were codified in classical 
jurisprudence.15  El-Gamal further contends that shari’a arbitrage is inherent in Islamic 
finance due to the structured financial products that endeavor to keep potential borrowers 
or lenders separated from interest-bearing loans.  This involves creating degrees of 
separation through multiple trades, special purpose vehicles, and the use of offshore 
financial centers (to minimize associated taxes and administrative costs), resembling the 
“layering” techniques used by money launders and criminal financiers.  Citing recent 
corporate scandals as evidence of the lack of sophistication on the part of Western 
regulators, and that such expertise exists to an even lesser degree in the Islamic world, he 
feels that Islamic finance is particularly vulnerable to abuse by the aforementioned 
criminal and terrorist elements.16 
Passas highlights the transition of terrorism financing from sovereign states and 
illegitimate transactions to more legitimate sources like legal businesses, investments, 
                                                 
13 Kepel, 76. 
14 Ibid., 79-80. 
15 Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), xi-xii, 176. 
16 Ibid., 23-24. 
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charities, and cultural activities.  The 9/11 Commission reported that al-Qaeda’s pre-9/11 
funding came from Islamic charities supported by people who were both knowledgeable 
and ignorant of the funds’ final destination.17  Regarding methods of funds transfer, 
Passas cites terrorists using well-regulated financial systems (as with the 9/11 hijackers), 
poorly-regulated formal systems, and unregulated informal value transfer systems 
(IVTS).  IVTS includes such mechanisms as hawala, physical couriers, invoice 
manipulation, and correspondent accounts for bank-to-bank transactions, with hawala 
drawing much attention after the 9/11 attacks based on the assumption that it was used 
for transferring funds for the attacks.  Although al-Qaeda has used hawala in locations 
with little or no formal financial infrastructure (such as Afghanistan), hawala was not 
used for the 9/11 attacks, and there is no evidence that terrorists have used it for their 
operations in the United States, Canada, or Europe.18 
Passas claims that IVTS was not the preferred method for terrorist funding 
transfers especially when formal banking networks could be utilized, but that as 
regulation and scrutiny over financial transactions are increased terrorists will be inclined 
to use more informal methods.  He makes no mention of Islamic banks being any more 
susceptible or prone to exploitation by terrorist financiers, pointing out that the al-Qaeda 
used the U.S. banking system to store and transfer funds for the attack.19  
Financing terrorism is also different from money laundering - since the funds 
slated for terrorism are not intended for legitimate use, there is no need to launder them.  
Moreover, since the amounts used for terrorist transactions are tiny in comparison with 
those associated with laundering criminal funds, typical anti-money laundering methods 
are insufficient to detect terrorism-related transfers.20 
Williams agrees with Passas that terrorists do not engage in laundering their funds 
in order to make them look legitimate, but that they do want to move their money 
                                                 
17 Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” in Terrorism Financing 
and State Responses, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 
2007), 24-25. 
18 Ibid., 29. 
19 Ibid., 30. 
20 Passas, 34. 
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covertly in order to avoid attention from authorities.  Accordingly, terrorist groups often 
use the same techniques as transnational criminal organizations.  In addition to using 
hawala, al-Qaeda has used charities and established front companies to perform 
seemingly legitimate financial transactions in the conventional banking system.21  Again, 
why would a terrorist group endure the more complicated methods associated with 
Islamic banking when the conventional system will do? 
James Hume, executive vice-president of the Dubai International Financial 
Centre, explains the rapid growth in Islamic banking as a result of the 9/11 attacks and 
increasing sophistication of the Islamic financial sector.  He argues that the “hardening of 
attitudes in the West and in the Islamic countries” has precipitated a flow of funds from 
the West to the Arabian Gulf countries to be invested in shari’a-compliant financial 
instruments.22  An increasingly-educated international Muslim populace, growing more 
aware of its Muslim roots, is becoming disillusioned with conventional finance and 
demanding Islamic alternatives.23 
 Hume cites increases in regulation and oversight as feeding the demand by 
changing the perception that Islamic banking is a lax and under-regulated industry.  Many 
Islamic institutions have adopted the Accounting, Auditing and Governance standards 
issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOFI), which he argues meet or exceed the conventional banking standards.  
Additionally, the Islamic Financial Standards Board, with representatives from the central 
banks of Muslim countries, focuses on standardizing the regulatory framework for 
Islamic banks.  Even Citibank and HSBC have entered the market and established 
independent Islamic banks.  These new opportunities are not only being use by Muslims - 
non-Muslims in Malaysia are buying up almost 70% of the products offered by Islamic 
banks.24  Hume’s argument concerning the evolution of Islamic banking into a significant 
                                                 
21 Phil Williams, “Warning Indicators and Terrorist Finances,” in Terrorism Financing and State 
Responses, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007), 85-86. 






and legitimate financial sector is quite compelling, doing much to dispel the view that it 
is a tool for radical Islamists to finance the expansion of their politics and terrorist 
operations. 
 Although there have been cases of Islamic banks being involved in some way in 
financing terrorist activity, the literature fails to prove the assumption that Islamic banks  
are connected to terrorism any more than conventional banks.  Furthermore, the recent 
surge in the Islamic financial sector is due to the growth in petroleum-related wealth and 
Muslim piety.     
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 Chapter II will present a theoretical and historical background in discussing the 
evolution of Islamic banking.  In addition to presenting the philosophers and initial 
financiers, the role of Islamism in the establishment of an Islamic banking industry and 
the primary financial instruments used in Islamic banking will be explained.  Chapter III 
will present the basic structure of an Islamic bank and compare Islamic banking in the 
different regions of the Muslim world, divided between the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) and Asia, and the West.  Particular attention will be paid to the roles Islamism, 
national development, and nationalism played in the development of Islamic banking.  
Chapter IV will discuss the liabilities and opportunities associated with Islamic banking, 
from its susceptibility to abuse by criminal elements to its potential for moderating 
extremism.  The current status of Islamic financial regulatory agencies will also be 
presented.  Chapter V will present the conclusions of the research and recommendations 
for why the United States should support the development of Islamic banking. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
After many countries in the Islamic world achieved political freedom following 
World War II, Muslims endeavored to revive their Islamic identity and live their lives 
according to the teachings of Islam.  They felt that the West’s political and economic 
hegemony over them had denied them socio-economic divine guidance.  The biggest 
challenge for Muslims in the economic field has been to transform their financial 
institutions so that they comply with shari’a (Islamic law). The dominance of the 
financial system by interest has made the task more formidable.  Those who do not 
understand shari’a would say that interest-free finance is a charitable undertaking, and 
although there is a portion of shari’a that advises making charitable loans for only a 
guaranteed return of principal, there is also a part that addresses advancing money to a 
party in order to share in its profits or bear the burden of its losses.25  
Although Islamic finance had been discussed and attempted in the past, the jump 
in oil prices in the early 1970s gave financiers the motivation and the means to seriously 
begin the Islamic finance experiment.  There was also a second jump in oil prices, 
increasing the transfer of wealth from oil consumers to oil producers, around the same 
time that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 established the first Islamic republic in the 
region, inspiring an Islamic revival in neighboring countries that strengthened the 
demand for more Islamic financial institutions.26  The early development of Islamic 
banking was not a simple economic response of supply meeting demand.  Grounded in 
the teachings of Islam, Islamic finance started as part of a larger Islamic economics, used 
as a tool in the advancement of Islam as a political movement.  Its origins 
notwithstanding, the increase in petroleum-related wealth has fueled the demand for 
shari’a-compliant financial instruments and resulted in Islamic finance’s growth in the 
past thirty years into a significant sector in the world’s financial industry. 
                                                 
25 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Karachi:  Maktaba Ma’ariful 
Qur’an, 2005), 9-10. 
26 Mohammed Akacem and Lynde Gilliam, “Principles of Islamic Banking,” Middle East Policy, IX, 
1 (Mar 2002): 124. 
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A. THE FOUNDATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Islamic finance comes under the rubric of Islamic economics, a system derived 
from shari’a and based on three ideas:  first, tawhid (divine unity), meaning that all 
economic activity must conform to divine commands as found in the Qur’an and ahadith 
(sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions); second, khilafah 
(vice regency), whereby Allah has entrusted humans with managing the world and its 
resources, implying a universal brotherhood; and third, adalah (justice), with the basic 
principle of economic organization being cooperation and concern for the welfare of 
others.  Beyond these overarching principles lie positive and negative injunctions, the 
basis of Islamic finance being the idea of qirad, or profit sharing.27  Although sharing 
profit and loss is touted as the foundation for Islamic finance, in reality the avoidance of 
interest (riba), and to a lesser degree speculation (gharar), is the foundation upon which 
all Islamic institutions are based. 
Islamic scholars (ulama) define riba as any form of interest or usury,28 meaning 
any increase returned on an amount of money borrowed, which is illegal under shari’a.  
These scholars believe that Muhammad’s view of riba went from exhortation during the 
Mecca period to prohibition during the Medina period, culminating with the disregard of 
the prohibition of riba putting one at war with God and Muhammad.29  The prohibition 
of charging interest is found in four different revelations of the Qur’an (30:39, 4:160-
161, 3:130-131, 2:275, 278-280) shown below in order of revelation: 
And [remember:] whatever you may give out in usury so that it might 
increase through [other] people’s possessions will bring  [you] no increase 
in the sight of God – whereas all that you give out in charity, seeking 
                                                 
27John Barkley Rosser and Rosser, Marina V., Comparative Economics in a Transforming World 
Economy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 2004): 100. 
28 Usury is usually considered a significant (often doubling) of the principal due to late payment. 
29 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press 
2005), 55-58. 
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God’s countenance, [will be blessed by Him:] for it is they, they [who thus 
seek His countenance] that shall have their recompense multiplied!30 
O you who have attained to faith!  Do not gorge yourself on usury, 
doubling and re-doubling it – but remain conscious of God, so that you 
might attain to a happy state; and beware of the fire which awaits those 
who deny the truth!31 
So, then, for the wickedness committed by those who followed the Jewish 
faith did We deny unto them certain of the good things of life which 
[aforetime] had been allowed to them; and [We did this] for their having 
so often turned away from the path of God, and [for] their taking usury 
although it had been forbidden to them, and their wrongful devouring of 
other people’s possessions.32 
Those who gorge themselves on usury behave but as he might behave 
whom Satan has confounded with this touch; for they say, “Buying and 
selling is but a kind of usury” – the while God has made buying and 
selling lawful and usury unlawful.  Hence, whoever becomes aware of his 
Sustainer’s admonition, and thereupon desists [from usury], may keep his 
past gains, and it will be for God to judge him; but as for those who return 
to it – they are destined for the fire, therein to abide!  O you who have 
attained to faith!  Remain conscious of God, and give up all outstanding 
gains from usury, if you are [truly] believers; for if you do it not, then 
know that you are at war with God and his Apostle.  But if you repent, 
then you shall be entitled to [the return of] your principal:  you will do no 
wrong, and neither will you be wronged.  If, however, [the debtor] is in 
straitened circumstances [grant him] a delay until a time of ease; and it 
should be of your own good – if you but knew it – to remit [the debt 
entirely] by way of charity.33 
 
                                                 
30 Qur’an (30:39). According to the translator’s, Muhammad Asad’s, notes this is the first mention of 
riba in the Qur’anic revelation, denoting an “‘increase’ or ‘addition’ of a thing above its original size or 
amount; it signifies an addition, by way of interest, to a sum of money or goods lent by one person or body 
of persons to another….Islamic scholars have not yet been able to reach an absolute agreement on the 
definition of riba: a definition, that is, which would cover all conceivable legal situations and positively 
respond to all the exigencies of a variable economic environment.”   
31 Qur’an (30:130-131). 
32 Qur’an (4:160-161). 
33 Qur’an (2:275,278-280). Asad also notes that this prohibition of riba by the Prophet in legal terms, 
having died a few days later, prohibiting his companions from asking him about the shari’a implications 
with respect to this injunction.  He further asserts that in spite of this explicit condemnation of riba, 
particularly as it relates to “an exploitation of the economically weak by the strong and resourceful,” the 
type of financial transactions falling under this characterization of riba is a moral question. 
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In short, these verses express the following ideas:  only profits from trade are 
allowed, riba cheapens God’s blessings, riba is equated to stealing others’ property, and 
Muslims should avoid riba for their own welfare.  This has formed the basis for Islamic 
banking whereby lenders must be willing to share in borrowers’ profits or losses in order 
to be compliant with shari’a. 34   
The existence of a pre-Islamic riba (riba al-jahiliyya), a form of crippling interest 
that doubles a debt if unpaid at maturity, has sparked much debate regarding the 
prohibition of interest in Islam.  Mohammed Said al-Ashmawi feels that the sweeping 
prohibition of riba is unwarranted based on three arguments:  first, the riba discussed in 
the Qur’an is of the pre-Islamic variety which could result in the enslavement of a 
borrower that could not pay; second, a widely-quoted hadith (singular of ahadith) 
mentions six commodities with respect to riba, modern currency not being in existence at 
the time; and third, a distinction should be made between exploitative loans made to poor 
individuals to meet basic needs and economically useful loans taken to invest in 
legitimate, profit-making ventures.35  Numerous fatwas (legal opinions) have been issued 
in support of limited interest-bearing transactions (most notably in 1989 by the mufti of 
the Egyptian Republic, Muhammad Sayyed Atiyya Tantawi), but these have been 
dismissed by the majority of the Islamic World.36 
The majority of shari’a scholars believe riba is prohibited because it is unfair, 
exploitative, and unproductive.  According to Islam, risk should be shared by the 
borrower and the lender, as opposed to the borrower alone either incurring the entire loss 





                                                 
34 Warde, 58. 
35 William E. Shephard, “Muhammad Sa’id Al-Ashmawi and the Application of the Shari’a in 
Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28, 1 (February 1996): 46-47. 
36 Warde, 57. 
 13
the enterprise.  While the proportion of the profit or loss must be agreed upon by the 
parties ahead of time, there cannot be a pre-determined, fixed compensation in the form 
of interest.37 
Although often ignored by many writings on Islamic finance, another of its 
foundations is the avoidance of gharar, loosely defined as uncertainty, risk, or 
speculation, but not the risk normally associated with normal commercial transactions.  
Gharar refers to “transactions conditioned on uncertain events,” and although not 
mentioned in the Qur’an by name, it is associated with the prohibition of playing Maysir 
(a game of chance played by Arabs, but usually associated with all games of chance 
(Qur’an [2:219, 5:90, and 5:91]).38  A number of ahadith condemn gharar, specifically 
as they relate to commercial transactions involving uncertainty:  
The Messenger of God forbade the “sale of the pebble’ [hasah, sale of an 
object chosen or determined by the throwing of a pebble], and the sale of 
gharar. 
Do not buy fish in the sea, for it is gharar. 
Whoever buys foodstuffs, let him not sell them until he has possession of 
them.39 
Strict adherence to the idea of gharar, which would make modern-day 
transactions found in the Western world practically impossible under Islamic finance, has 
precipitated intense debate among Islamic scholars from the various legal schools over 
the years.  Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who sought to refashion contract law under fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence), influenced later schools and is held in high regard by most 
modern practitioners for his unique positions.  He argued that interpreting gharar so as to 
completely bar the nonexistence and lack of knowledge would unduly restrict contractual 
freedom resulting in overt legalism and a reduction in people’s welfare.  Viewing gharar 
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as a question of degree, he resolved that uncertainty can never be completely removed 
from a contract and that a contract may have minor gharar.40 
B. THE BEGINNING OF AN ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
In spite of the historical roots, Islamic finance as it is practiced today was born 
after World War II through the idea of Islamic economics, part of a move in late-colonial 
India to advance an Islamic character as a means of identity creation and protection.  The 
rhetoric of the doctrine, however, is that Islamic economics has existed since the dawn of 
Islam, and Islamic economists are merely uncovering the forgotten yet eternal teachings.  
Sayyid Abul-Ala Mawdudi, founder of Jamaat-I Islami (Party of Islam), first in India and 
then in Pakistan, rejected the idea of a separate homeland for Indian Muslims, advocating 
instead a cultural reassertion rather than political separation.  He promoted the idea of 
Islamic economics as a means of rediscovering the traditions that once brought Islam its 
power, glory, and prosperity.  He feared that the illusion of communal safety that would 
accompany the creation of Pakistan would reduce Islam’s relevance to daily life.  
Economic activity in particular, because it occurs outside the home, would be a way of 
keeping Islam continuously in public view, heightening Islam’s visibility.  Due to the 
vast amount of time associated with economic activity, Mawdudi felt it was imperative to 
make it a religious activity in order that economic development, often associated with the 
secular West, would increase the perceived role of Islam in the lives of Muslims.41   
Islam being a religion more concerned with orthopraxy (behavioral correctness) 
over orthodoxy (doctrinal correctness), Mawdudi sought to update this orthopraxy in a 
way that would sustain communal identity.  Essentially a reformist Islamist, he was 
seeking a religious revival that promoted modernization without Westernization.  With 
economic change being central to modernization, he advocated the development of 
Islamic economics as the economic component of a new Islamic orthopraxy.42 
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In his The Economic Problem of Man and its Islamic Solution, Mawdudi contends 
that man’s economic problem is how to organize economic distribution in order to supply 
all men with the basic necessities for existence with the ultimate goal of sustaining and 
developing civilization.  Furthermore, he felt it imperative that everyone must be given 
the opportunity to maximize his personal potential in accordance with his capabilities.  
He criticized the world’s tendency to separate this economic problem from the larger part 
of human life, considering it the sole problem of life, and that the whole scheme of life 
needs to be examined.43  This formed the basis for his argument of the need for an 
Islamic economics since all of life was to be lived in accordance with Islam. 
Mawdudi argued that man’s natural selfish tendency to exceed the limits of 
moderation, exacerbated by other immoral habits, was supported by a political system 
with no moral basis.  Although he believed that it was naturally acceptable for there to be 
moderate economic disparity among men, man’s failure was his selfish accumulation of 
other people’s wealth, specifically through lending money on interest and investing in 
commercial activities.  By setting aside wealth for savings or investment, the wealthy 
leave consumer goods unpurchased, ultimately resulting in a spiraling debt and a 
decreasingly smaller wealthy class and an increasingly larger poor class.44   
In line with Islam’s support of commerce and private property, Mawdudi was 
critical of communism and fascism as potential answers to man’s economic problem.  He 
described communism as an attempt to treat “the economic problem as the central 
problem and then tries to revolve the whole of human life around this axis.”  Although 
the whole community is supposed to share ownership of the means of production and 
distribution of products, ultimately the management of these resources will be assumed 
by a small executive body and the community will be subject to its whims.  He viewed 
fascism in much the same light.  Although individual ownership of the means of 
production would remain, the coercive power of the state would enslave the people.45 
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Mawdudi offered Islam as a third way, a solution based on staying on the natural 
path, creating the right moral attitude among men, and minimizing state involvement in 
the economy.  In his societal model, man would retain the fruits of his labor and conduct 
business in a way that did not exploit the weaker sections of society, taking care not to 
engage in activities that are unlawful (haram) under Islam (such as drinking alcohol, 
music, dancing, bribery, stealing, speculation, etc.).  Life should be lived in a decent 
manner of average standard, with surplus wealth being used to advance public welfare 
and help those that are less fortunate.  An Islamic society would respect those who earn 
and spend over those who hoard or invest their wealth.  He emphasized the legal 
limitations Islam has placed on the use of surplus wealth, specifically lending money for 
interest.  Using surplus wealth as an investment should be done as a joint undertaking 
whereby all parties share in the profits and losses.46  These ideas were to be the 
foundation for Islamic finance. 
Mawdudi emphasized the importance of the Muslim umma (community) and its 
expectation of solidarity under traditional Islamic principles, along with the traditions and 
similarities of the world’s Muslims.  He argued that restoring the vitality of the umma 
would overcome any cultural, linguistic, historical, and political differences.  He used 
Islam’s “Golden Age,” the twenty-nine-year period of the four “rightly guided” caliphs, 
as evidence of the cooperation, justice, and self-sacrifice capable under Islamic solidarity.  
Additionally, Mawdudi did not believe Islam and the West could coexist, in line with 
Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.”  Islam and the West were at war over the 
loyalty of Muslims and economics was to be one of the battle grounds.47 
Muqtada as-Sadr, another prominent Islamic thinker, laid out his plan for an 
Islamic economic system in his Iqtisaduna (Our Economics).  His concept of Islamic 
economics comprised three main principles:  first, double ownership whereby the 
distribution system is defined; second, economic freedom limited by Islamic values 
pertaining to production, exchange, and consumption; and third, a social justice based on 
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reciprocal responsibility and balance in order to ensure happiness.48  As-Sadr found 
absolute capitalism and socialism flawed because of their fundamental, and seemingly 
exclusive, beliefs in private ownership and public ownership, respectively.  He argued 
that the Islamic system was superior due to its ability to see the need for a combination of 
private and public ownership.  Regarding economic freedom with respect to these two 
systems, he found the unrestricted freedom of capitalism and the contrasting constraints 
of socialism to be incongruent with society’s overall well-being, while Islam’s system 
was more in line with man’s nature.  Humanity benefited by placing restrictions on social 
freedoms in the economic field that were in line with Islam’s values and ideals.  These 
restrictions comprised two areas:   personal, based on the “spiritual and ideological 
content of the Islamic personality,” and societal, where “an external power…defines and 
regulates the social behaviours.”  Both of these would be under the authority of shari’a.49  
The third element, social justice, would be realized through general reciprocal 
responsibility and social balance, both of which, through their Islamic sense, would 
precipitate the social values and justice that would ensure a just distribution of wealth in 
society.50 
At this point, one can discern that as-Sadr’s doctrine focused on the idea of justice 
and that man’s personal and social interests were in conflict.  He believed that the 
“rational economic man” is incompatible with the Islamic economic system, and that 
Islamic man’s belief in the spiritual world is required for the Islamic economic system.  
Moreover, he sees flaws in allowing individuals to satisfy their personal desires due to 
the concomitant creation of socio-economic problems.51  “It is realized from all this that 
the crux of the social problem is but the personal impulse and that this impulse is deeply 
rooted in man as it springs from his love for his ownself.”52  Although the market and the 
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state have roles to play in his Islamic economic system, the overriding influence and 
guidance would come from Islam53 - “Hence comes the role of religion being the only 
solution of the problem because religion constitutes the only framework in which the 
social problem could be solved.”54  As-Sadr’s Islamic economic system could not stand 
alone, however, but was a part of an entire Islamic society that would guide the various 
aspects of life in such a society.55 
Like other Islamic economists, as-Sadr believed that distribution (ownership) of a 
society’s resources should be based on a man’s work, and that need should also play a 
role.  He realized, however, that there must be a balance, since a distribution system that 
focused solely on need would undermine itself by reducing the incentive to produce, as 
was the case with communism.  While he believed that private wealth comprised things 
that were taken from the earth, such as agricultural commodities or fish, the land and the 
sea constituted public wealth and could not be privately owned because the basis of 
private ownership was work.56 
He saw problems in the modern age with the cash system, in contrast to the barter 
age where there was a balance between supply and demand.  The modern age saw 
suppliers selling their products to acquire cash that they would subsequently hoard, 
taking it out of productive circulation.  Such hoarding can disrupt markets by creating 
false demands or predatory pricing to remove competitors, to the detriment of society.  
Interest drives this disruption in society’s harmony by incentivizing its citizens to hoard 
cash in order increase wealth through interest.  Whereas an investor could benefit society 
by financing a project that could increase society’s overall productivity, he may instead 
choose to keep his money in an interest-bearing account due to its more favorable rate of 
return.  Under Islam, such usurious activity was strictly forbidden, helping to maintain 
the general economic balance.57 
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According to Justice Muhammad Taqi Usmani, the unbridled profit motive of 
secular capitalism drives economic decisions and, through such tools as interest and 
speculation, creates monopolies and concentrates wealth in the hands of the few.  There is 
no divine guidance to encourage the natural process of supply and demand and control 
economic activities.  Under Islam, the divine restrictions on such economic activities as 
riba, hoarding, short sales, and speculative transactions “have a cumulative effect of 
maintaining balance, distributive justice, and equality of opportunity.”58  Although 
Islamic economics seems to address the majority of social ills supposedly associated with 
western market economies, it has little to say about dealing with such annoyances as 
inflation.  
C. THE CREATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The basic idea behind Islamic economics, that within Islam lay a means of 
conducting financial affairs, took form in Islamic banks in the second half of the 
twentieth century.59  The first known successful Islamic bank was in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Pilgrims’ Administration and Fund (Tabung Hajji) established a few years after 
Malaysia’s independence in 1956.  The newly-independent government supported the 
idea of a bank that catered to Malays who made up the poor and Muslim majority of 
Malaysian society.  The Malay population, mainly rural peasants living a subsistence 
existence, liked the idea of an institution that would finance the hajj (spiritual trip to 
Mecca).  The Fund, controlled and sponsored by the government, ensured a large number 
of depositors by requiring all Malays to process their hajj papers through the Fund, 
making it convenient for them to keep their savings with it as well.  Beginning with 
investing hajj savings in accordance with shari’a, the Fund expanded into real estate, 
industrial, and agricultural sectors.  It developed its own ideas and Islamic financial 
instruments independently from the Middle East, Middle Eastern Islamic financers 
remaining ignorant of the Malaysian institution until it was discovered through a 
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presentation to the Islamic Development Bank during negotiations to establish the 
Islamic Bank of Malaysia.60  This separation explains the difference in regional banking 
products that will be discussed later. 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt embraced Islamic banking as a vehicle for 
advancing political Islam.  This initial relationship evolved into a mutually-beneficial one 
between the conservative Islamism of the Arab world and the expertise of several leading 
Western banks, financial institutions, and universities.61  According to most scholars, the 
first physical manifestation between Islamism and Islamic finance occurred in 1963 with 
the creation of the Mit Ghamr Bank by Ahmed an-Najjar, a German-trained Egyptian 
banker.  After receiving his PhD in social economics in Germany, an-Najjar returned to 
Egypt in order to establish a bank based on the German savings bank model.  After 
receiving German support for his project, he contacted the director of the State 
Intelligence Agency (al-Mokhabarat) through family contacts.  Al-Mokhabarat 
introduced him to officials in the Ministry of Economy who finally approved his project.  
With President Gamal Abd an-Nasser vehemently opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and their Islamic cause, an-Najjar was careful to distance himself from Islam, never 
making any reference to it for fear that his project would be rejected.62   Even with the 
bank’s charter excluding any references to Islam, the bank earned profits through direct 
partnerships with industry and other profit-sharing enterprises, never charging or paying 
interest.63  However, at the time neither this bank nor Tabung Hajji in Malaysia offered 
current accounts or check facilities, failing to satisfy the daily commercial transactions of 
regular businesses.64 
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Some have questioned an-Najjar’s contention that he created the first Islamic 
bank since he had told neither the public nor the state of his Islamic motivation.  “Just as 
there is no Islamic movement without reference to Islam, there can be no Islamic bank 
without an Islamic reference and discourse.  Hostility to usury is not specific to Islam.  
What makes a bank Islamic is therefore not avoidance of interest alone but the location of 
this avoidance in an Islamic framework and discourse that prohibits riba.”65  Jamal al 
Banna, brother of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, counters this 
view in an unpublished book he wrote that describes the founding of the Mit Ghamr 
Bank.  According to Jamal al-Banna, an-Najjar did “not consider Islamic economics as a 
science or a study, but as a cause for awakening the Muslims, and a method for their 
renaissance.  Therefore, he considers ‘Islamic banks’ only as a base for his mission.”  An-
Najjar claims to have started his bank as a counter to the Marxism and nationalism that 
was beginning to sweep Egypt at the expense of Islam.  Nasser’s opposition to Islamic 
political activity and the Muslim Brotherhood precluded an-Najjar from stating his true 
goals.66  Others have countered that an-Najjar revealed his zeal and accomplishment only 
after Islamic banking was legalized in the late 1970s.67   
Investing in many of an-Najjar’s early ventures, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
deeply involved in his work and had infiltrated Mit Ghamr as clients, depositors, and 
employees.68  At its closure by the state in 1967, Mit Ghamr had nine branches and 
250,000 depositors.  After his bank’s closure, an-Najjar traveled to Sudan, Germany, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia promoting Islamic banking and 
over the next 30 years would appear wherever an Islamic bank opened, including when 
the Saudi-backed Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) commissioned the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Jeddah in 1974.  According to an-Najjar, he met 
Prince Mohammed al Faisal al Saud (son of King Faisal) at an IDB meeting in the early 
                                                 
65 Soliman, 268. 
66 Dreyfuss, 179. 
67 Soliman, 268. 
68 Kahf, 19. 
 22
1970s.  Prince Mohammed and Sheikh Saleh Kamel, another disciple of an-Najjar, would 
establish empires in the world of Islamic banking.69   
An-Najjar’s bank had been popular among the poorer elements of Egyptian 
society, encouraging saving and assisting small-scale entrepreneurs.  Possibly in response 
to public pressure to provide a replacement after Mit Ghamr’s closure, the government of 
Egypt established the Nasser Social Bank (NSB) in 1971 as a de facto Islamic bank.  The 
state mandated such Islamic principles as interest-free financing and zakat (alms-giving), 
charging the bank with accepting voluntary zakat and distributing it according to 
shari’a.70  Ostensibly, the state established the NSB to foster social solidarity and assist 
the poorer members of Egyptian society,71 but there was also a political motive.  
President Anwar as-Sadat, having inherited the leftist-leaning groups from the Nasser 
years, needed the support of the Islamists in his crackdown on the remaining Nasserites 
and purge of the Arab Socialist Union.72  Ironically, the charter used tenets from Arab 
socialism rather than Islam to explain interest-free banking practices, and the Ministry of 
Social affairs, which has no religious competence, was responsible for the bank’s 
management.  Again, due to the lack of an Islamic reference in the bank’s name and 
charter, some would not consider the NSB an Islamic bank.  The importance in 
distinguishing the Mit Ghamr and NSB from Islamic banks is due to the logic behind 
their establishment.  The former assists the poor by encouraging saving and mobilizing 
their resources, filling a social and economic need along with conventional banks.  
Islamic banks are based and developed “on the idea that all other banks are illicit and that 
Islamic banks should replace them.”73  This differentiation may be useful in analyzing 
the role of Islamism in banking, but unimportant economically as Islamic financial 
products, once utilized by only the pious, are also being used by Muslims and non-
Muslims for portfolio diversification.  
                                                 
69 Dreyfuss, 179-180. 
70 Kahf, 19. 
71 Warde, 74. 
72 Kahf, 33. 
73 Soliman, 269. 
 23
Although Pakistani scholars had done most of the theoretical work on Islamic 
financials systems since the 1940s, the political and economic events associated with 
pan-Islamism (following the defeat of the Arab states at the hands of Israel in the 1967 
war) and the increase oil prices in the early 1970s created the incentives to transform the 
theory to reality.  The OIC, created in 1970 and largely dominated by Saudi Arabia, took 
the lead in establishing Islamic banking.  The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74 helped 
convince King Faisal of Saudi Arabia that a pan-Islamic bank would assist the Islamic 
world in gaining more control over its economic and political destiny.74  Specifically, 
“the idea of establishing an international development bank for the Islamic world was 
suggested for two main reasons: 1) to enhance the OIC as a potential power base for 
some of the newly enriched countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Algeria; and 2) to 
serve as a buffer institution for distributing financial aid from the Muslim oil-exporting 
countries, especially the Gulf states, to their brethren in Africa and Asia.”75  It was also 
believed that a shari’a-compliant bank would attract idle money that had deliberately 
been kept out of conventional banking.  Created at the 1974 OIC summit in Lahore, the 
inter-governmental IDB was to become the foundation of Islamic banking.  Beyond 
assisting cash-starved regions, providing fee-based financial services, managing income 
received from interest earned from non-Muslim countries and zakat funds, and serving as 
an international payment clearinghouse between Muslim countries, it would provide the 
expertise to promote the creation of additional Islamic institutions.  Of the forty-four 
founding member countries, the largest shareholders were Saudi Arabia (25%), Libya 
(16%), the United Arab Emirates (14%), and Kuwait (13%).76   
The Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB), considered to be the first modern, private Islamic 
bank, was created in 1975 by a successful local entrepreneur with ties to the ruling family 
of Dubai.  His background and socio-political connections allowed him to operate the 
bank according to his own management style and understanding of shari’a.  Both the 
DIB and IDB had been established without shari’a boards - at the time there was not a 
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manual or clear understanding of how a shari’a-compliant large-scale bank should 
operate.   The banks separately approached shari’a scholars, seeking their consultations 
on operations and fatwas on specific questions.  With only minor exceptions, the 
activities of both banks were shari’a-compliant, but only in 1999 did the DIB establish its 
own shari’a council, and the IDB waited until 2003.77 
During the next ten years, Islamic banking spread throughout the Middle East:  
Kuwait Finance House (1977), Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (1977), Islamic Bank of 
Sudan (1977), Jordan Islamic Bank of Finance and Investment (1978), Bahrain Islamic 
Bank (1978), and International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development in Egypt 
(1980).  Islamic finance also spread beyond the region in the form of international 
investment banks in such places as Nassau, Geneva, and Manama.  This surge in Islamic 
financial institutions was due to the efforts of the previously-mentioned Prince 
Muhammad and Saleh Kamel.78 
Prince Muhammad’s establishment of the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt was not 
only the foundation for his Islamic banking empire, but it also established the alliance 
between bankers and the ulama.  The Prince knew that his prior relationship with an-
Najjar would be a liability in establishing a private Islamic bank in Egypt, and he would 
have to distance himself from the Muslim Brotherhood because “its elitist style precludes 
it from offering him contacts with businesses in Egypt and other Arab countries.”  
Needing someone who would be acceptable to the local populace, the Islamists, and the 
government, the Prince engaged the Grand Mufti of Egypt, the country’s most senior 
Islamic jurist.  He was able to provide the Prince with local legitimacy and still maintain 
his good relations with the government; the latter being especially important since a 
special law was needed to establish Egypt’s first private Islamic bank.  This was the 
beginning of the alliance between the ulama and bankers that would prove significant for 
the next 25 years.  These shari’a scholars were important for their close contact with the 
small and medium-sized businessmen and middle-income earners whom the bankers 
hoped to attract, enjoying a rapport with the Muslim populous unknown by the Islamic 
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economic and financial elite and Islamists at the time.  In exchange for an agreement by 
Islamic bankers to conduct operations in accordance with shari’a, to include not only the 
prohibition of interest but also the other financial transactions covered by fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence), the ulama gave the bankers credibility and legitimacy.79 
Prince Muhammad’s work did not end in Egypt.  In 1977 he established the 
International Association of Islamic Banks as a source of expertise for new Islamic 
banks.  One of its first endeavors was the Handbook of Islamic Banking, designed to be a 
practical source of information for bankers and “the definitive reference for Islamic 
institutions.”80  Prince Muhammad established the international network known as the 
Faisal Group, comprising all or part of the Jordan Islamic Bank, the Faisal Islamic Bank 
of Sudan, and Faisal Finance House in Turkey. The nerve center of his empire, however, 
was the Dar al-Maal al-Islami (House of Islamic Funds), or DMI, a holding company 
founded at an Islamic summit in Taif, Saudi Arabia in 1981.  With a large international 
reach, DMI is based in the Bahamas, maintains its operations center in Geneva, and at 
one time enjoyed subsidiaries in Bahrain, Pakistan, Turkey, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Guinea, Senegal, and Niger.81 
Saleh Kamel, brother-in-law of then-Saudi Crown Prince Fahd and a leading 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded the Al-Baraka group and was managing 
director of the Saudi family-controlled Al-Baraka Investment and Development 
Company which operates on a non-interest basis.  In addition to sponsoring annual 
seminars which bring together economists, bankers, and shari’a scholars, Kamel 
established the Saleh Kamel Center for Islamic Economic Studies at al Azhar, the 
thousand-year-old center for Islamic learning in Cairo.82 
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Oddly enough, Prince Muhammad and Kamel, both prominent Saudis and heads 
of the two largest Islamic banking groups, were refused licenses to operate commercial 
banks in Saudi Arabia.  This refusal was due to the paradox of power of Saudi Arabia’s 
ruling family - its legitimacy is tied to Islam, but the management of its economy and 
banking system are based on conventional practices.  To recognize an Islamic bank 
would be de-facto recognition that all other banks in Saudi Arabia are un-Islamic.  
Although officially all banks are classified as Islamic, non-royal Ar-Rajhi Banking and 
Investment Company (ARABIC), authorized in 1985 to conduct interest-free banking, is 
forbidden to use the word Islamic in its name.  Interest generated by the country’s vast 
bank deposits and foreign assets are often known by other names.83 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, DMI and Al-Baraka developed close ties with 
institutions in London, New York, Hong Kong, Switzerland, the Bahamas, and the 
Cayman Islands.  During an Islamic banking conference in Baden-Baden, West Germany, 
Ibrahim Kamel, DMI’s vice chairman and CEO, credited Price Waterhouse for its 
contribution to establishing DMI’s Geneva operations center:  “The people who 
explained [Islamic Banking] to the Swiss Banking Commission are Price Waterhouse, 
who have been auditing us for over three years.”  Western financial centers have hosted 
dozens of Islamic banking conferences, and, in partnership with Islamic banks, have 
founded Islamic financial research programs in Western universities, such as the Harvard 
Islamic Finance Information Program (HIFIP) in 1995.84 
D. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
Islamic finance goes beyond merely the prohibition of interest to the idea that 
money should be based on equity rather than debt.  In lieu of interest, Islamic banking 
uses the profit and loss sharing (PLS) system whereby the bank and the borrower make 
an agreement on how to divide the share of profits or burden of losses for a financed 
enterprise.  Money is not considered capital in Islam, but potential capital, with returns 
only justified if there is a risk of loss.  Contrary to conventional banking where the 
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practice preceded the theory, in Islamic banking the theory preceded the practice with the 
underlying rules revealed in the Qur’an and ahadith.85 
Asset-backed (or equity-based) financing is at the heart of Islamic banking since 
money has no intrinsic value under Islam and is simply a medium of exchange.  All units 
of the same currency are equal, so they cannot be traded for profit.  Profit can only be 
generated through selling items with intrinsic utility or exchanging different currencies.  
Capital is not separate from entrepreneurship - by contributing capital in the form of 
money to a commercial venture an investor assumes risk and is entitled to a proportionate 
share of the actual profit.  The primary instruments of Islamic finance are musharaka, 
mudaraba, murabaha, ijara, salam, istisna’ and sukuk.86 
1. Musharaka 
Musharaka (sharing) is a joint enterprise in which the profit or loss of a joint 
venture is shared by the partners in pre-determined proportions.  All partners are entitled 
to engage in management of the enterprise unless there is an alternate agreement among 
all the partners.  Cash or commodities may be contributed as share capital in a musharaka 
contract, and it is not valid under shari’a if the terms of profit distribution are not spelled 
before the contract goes into effect.  Although Muslim jurists disagree as to the 
appropriate ratio for sharing profits (whether they should be distributed in proportion to 
the amount of capital invested versus another ratio agreed to by the partners), they 
unanimously agree that each partner’s share of the losses be in proportion to his amount 
invested.87   
A partner may leave a musharaka merely by giving written notice to the other 
partners.  Although this can be used to completely dissolve the musharaka this need not 
be the case if the other partners wish to continue the enterprise.  If there is a dispute as to 
the value of the departing partner’s shares, he may compel the other partners to liquidate 
and distribute all assets.  The exception to this situation would be in the case of a large, 
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long-term project in which vast sums of money have been invested and the termination of 
the project in its infancy could be “fatal to the interests of the partners, as well as to the 
economic growth of the society,” in which case the partner would be denied the right of 
liquidation or separation.  This is supported by the following hadith of the Prophet 
Muhammad: 
All the conditions agreed upon by the muslims are upheld, except a 
condition which allows what is prohibited or prohibits what is lawful.88   
Musharaka can also be used as a method of finance under a diminishing 
partnership (musharaka mutanaqisah).  Under this arrangement, ownership is shared 
between the customer and the financial institution, with the customer’s payments 
constituting a rent on the financial institution’s share of the property and a principal 
payment so that the customer is buying the institution’s shares of the property over 
time.89 
2. Mudaraba  
Mudaraba is a special profit-sharing enterprise where one partner serves as the 
investor and only provides the capital and the other partner is the entrepreneur and 
provides the management and labor.  Unlike a musharaka, the investor is excluded from 
management, the sole responsibility of the entrepreneur.  Although the ratio of profit 
sharing is established in the contract, unlike a musharaka, the investor suffers any and all 
losses.  The logic behind this difference is that should the enterprise fail the 
entrepreneur’s labor will have been fruitless and constitutes his share of loss.  With the 
exception of daily expenses and food (although on this the ulama are not unanimous), the 
entrepreneur cannot claim a periodic salary or fee of any kind for his work done in 
support of the mudaraba.  Additionally, the investor’s liability is limited to his 
investment unless he gave the entrepreneur permission to incur additional debts.  Either 
party can terminate the contract with written notification to the other party.  Since all 
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assets purchased by the entrepreneur are the sole property of the investor, only the profit 
is distributed at termination in accordance with the predetermined ratio (assets may need 
to be liquidated in order to make this distribution).90 
3. Murabaha 
Murabaha, the most widely-used of all the shari’a-compliant financial 
instruments in Islamic banking is a term of Islamic fiqh where one person sells another a 
commodity at cost plus a certain profit with payment being made on the spot or in the 
future.  In its original Islamic connotation, murabaha was simply a sale, its distinguishing 
feature being the disclosure of the cost and profit to the buyer.  (Simply selling a 
commodity at profit without revealing the cost is called a musawamah.)  Although 
Islamic jurists have written volumes on the vast and intricate rules governing the contract 
of sale, the rules relevant to murabaha transactions are as follows: 
1. The subject of sale must be existing at the time of sale. 
2. The subject of sale must be in the ownership of the seller at the time of 
sale. 
3. The subject of the sale must be in the physical or constructive 
possession (commodity is in control of the seller with all its rights and 
liabilities) of the seller when it sells it to another person. 
4. The sale must be instant and absolute.  Thus a sale attributed to a 
future date or a sale contingent on a future event is void. 
5. The subject of sale must be a property of value.  Thus, a thing having 
no value according to the usage of trade cannot be sold or purchased. 
6. The subject of sale should not be a thing which is not used except for 
haram (forbidden) purposes, like pork, wine, etc. 
7. The subject of sale must be specifically known and identified to the 
buyer.  The subject of sale may be identified either by pointation or by 
detailed specification which can distinguish it from other things not 
sold. 
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8. The delivery of the sold commodity to the buyer must be certain and 
should not depend on a contingency or chance. 
9. The certainty of price is a necessary condition for the validity of a sale.  
If the price is uncertain, the sale is void. 
10. The sale must be unconditional.  A conditioned sale is invalid unless 
the condition is recognized according to the usage of trade as a part of 
the transaction. 
 
Additionally, payment may be deferred (known as a bai’ mu’ajjal), the seller can assess 
penalties for late payment (but they must be donated to charities), and a promissory note 
or bill of exchange signed by the buyer can only be sold at its face value.91 
Originally a particular type of sale, murabaha was never intended to be a mode of 
financing, only a means of avoiding interest, a stepping stone during the Islamization of 
an economy to the preferred musharaka and mudaraba, considered by the ulama to be 
better instruments for implementing the economic objectives of Islam.  Therefore, the 
ulama have instituted strict guidelines in order to draw a clear line between a murabaha 
transaction and a conventional loan.  In addition to the aforementioned requirements, the 
additional guidelines include the following:  first, murabaha can only be used to purchase 
commodities and not fund daily operating expenses; second, although it is preferred that 
the financier purchases and takes possession of the commodity, when this is not 
practicable, the customer may act as the financier’s agent, buy the commodity on his 
behalf, and then buy it from the financier; third and most important, the institution must 
bear the risk of the commodity in between initially buying the commodity and selling it 
to the customer.92 
Due to murabaha’s apparent similarity to conventional financing, it has become a 
source of debate in the world of Islamic banking, particularly as it relates to the ideas of 
the time value of money, using interest rates as a benchmark for mark-ups, collateral, and 
securitization of a murabaha.  First, a sale based on deferred payment is interest only 
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when the item being exchanged for an increase in price is money itself, which has no 
intrinsic value in Islam.  When a commodity is being sold in exchange for money, a seller 
may increase the price of a product because he is extending “credit” to the buyer, which 
is acceptable under shari’a.  Second, many Islamic institutions use an interest rate like 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as a benchmark for calculating an 
appropriate profit or mark-up for a murabaha.  While not desired due its resemblance to 
charging interest, the use of such a benchmark does not render the transaction haram 
since no interest is being assessed and currently there is not a specific benchmark for 
Islamic banks and financial institutions.  Third, the seller of a commodity may ask for a 
security to ensure the prompt payment, and it may be in the form of a mortgage, lien or 
charge, or even the sold commodity.  All that is required is that the murabaha price be set 
before the security is furnished.  Fourth, since the transfer of a murabaha would mean the 
transfer of money, it cannot be securitized and sold for profit in a secondary market like 
other conventional debt instruments.93 
4. Ijara 
Ijara is another term of Islamic fiqh that means “to give something on rent,” 
applying either to a person, as in the case of his hired services, or assets and property, as 
in a lease situation.  Leasing under ijara is similar to conventional leasing whereby the 
lessee pays rent to the lessor for the usufruct of an inconsumable asset.  The lessor is 
responsible for all liabilities associated with ownership (such as property taxes), while the 
lessee is responsible for the liabilities associated with use (such as utility bills).  The asset 
may be sold in a secondary market, but with it goes the rights and responsibility of 
ownership of the asset.  Rights to the rent alone cannot be sold.94  Finally, and most 
importantly, the object being leased must be owned by the lessor.95 
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5. Salam and Istisna’ 
Salam and istisna’ are the two exceptions to the rules regarding the existence and 
possession of a commodity prior to entering a contract to sell it.   In a salam transaction, a 
buyer pays an increased price at spot in return for specific goods to be delivered at a 
future date.  The Prophet Muhammad permitted this kind of sale after he prohibited riba 
so that farmers could acquire money in advance in order to grow their crops.  This line of 
reasoning also applied to the Arabian traders.  In brief, salam requires that the buyer pay 
the full price at the time the sale is arranged, and the commodities being sold must be 
exactly specified in quality and quantity, with a specific date of delivery.  To the 
consternation of modern financial institutions, payment will be in the form of 
commodities and not money, and the institutions cannot sell the commodities before they 
have taken possession.  The bank can arrange for the sale of the commodities in advance 
through a parallel salam, a promise to purchase from a third party, or the commodities 
can be sold back to the original seller at a higher price.96 
Istisna’, the second exception to the existence and possession rules, involves 
ordering manufactured products.  Although like a salam where the price and 
specifications are fixed at the time the contract is settled, the delivery time need not be 
fixed and the manufacturer uses his own material.  Istisna’ can be used as a means of 
financing transactions like house construction with the payment made in installments, in 
addition to public projects like bridges or highways.  The modern Buy, Operate, and 
Transfer (BOT) agreement is a kind of istisna’ in which the builder accepts the right to 
operate the highway and collects tolls for a specified period as payment for 
construction.97 
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6. Sukuk 
Sukuk,98 also known as “Islamic bonds,” are the shari’a-compliant debt 
instruments that represent proportional ownership in an asset or pool of assets.  Until 
recently, issues of sukuk have been limited to sovereign entities, but the last few years 
have seen a substantial growth in the private sector.  Generally, sukuk comprise Islamic 
bonds and Islamic asset securitizations.  Rather than being based on the assets or cash 
flows from those assets, bond sukuk are based on the credit of the issuing entity.  
Securitization involves an originator transferring assets into a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) which holds the asset that is being securitized.  While the SPV issues the sukuk to 
investors, it also leases the asset back to the originator under an ijara, with the payments 
to the investors coming from the originators lease payments through the SPV.  Payments 
may be predetermined or a share of the profits or losses, the majority of sukuk being the 
former.  In order to be shari’a-compliant, sukuk must meet the following requirements: 
they are not debts of the originator; they are fractional interests in assets, usufructs, 
services, projects, or investment activities; they may not be issued on receivables; and the 
underlying business endeavor must be shari’a compliant.99 
Sukuk could be the foundation of the seemingly-elusive Islamic capital market, 
especially secondary markets, serving as a further incentive for their use in sovereign, 
corporate, project, or asset finance.100  Global sukuk issuance has increased from $20B in 
2006 to a predicted $50B in 2007, accounting for a third of bond sales in the Gulf States.  
In addition to Gulf holdings, sukuk have been used to assist Arab investors to acquire 
shares in such large western companies as General Electric, P&O, Sainsbury’s, Deutsche 
Bank, and HSBC.101 
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What was originally driven by piety to be used in the construction of a utopian 
society has been co-opted by the very economic forces that the original pioneers berated 
and developed into a multi-billion dollar industry.  Capitalism’s law of supply and 
demand has brought about the growth of Islamic banking from a niche market into a 
global industry.  Although the Islamic bank is still frequented primarily by the pious 
Muslim, it has evolved into something more than a tool of societal change.  The next 




III. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
Expanding from only one Islamic bank in 1975 to over 300 today with more than 
$500 billion in assets, Islamic finance is growing an estimated 15 percent a year and is 
expected to continue its ascent.  Growing oil wealth, a strong demand for shari’a-
compliant financial services by large numbers of immigrant and non-immigrant Muslims, 
and the attractiveness of the competitive Islamic financial instruments to Muslim and 
non-Muslim investors are touted as being behind the sector’s strong growth.  The foreign 
and domestic Islamic debt markets have been the most rapidly growing segments of 
Islamic finance.  For example, in Malaysia, Islamic securities accounted for total 
outstanding private debt and bonds at 42 percent and 25 percent, respectively.  While the 
sukuk market is enjoying rapid development, holders tend to keep bonds to maturity, 
restricting secondary market trading.  Islamic investment funds, comprising such 
categories as equity, real estate and property, commodity, and leasing, are in demand in 
the Gulf countries and Malaysia, with the preferred equity funds enjoying 25 percent 
growth in assets from 1997 through 2003.102 
According to Mohsin Nathani, CEO and managing director of Citi Islamic 
Investment Bank, Citigroup’s shari’a-compliant wing, “GCC liquidity is fueling the 
growth of both Islamic and conventional finance, but Islamic finance is growing notably 
faster.”  With the saturation of local equities and real estate, GCC investors are looking 
for new religiously-acceptable investments, often outside of the region.  Not only is GCC 
money expanding operations into Asia, but it is also funding Islamic banking in the 
West.103     Islamic banking is not the same in all countries, however, and the difference 
is not just whether the country’s population is primarily Muslim or Christian.  The nature 
of the Islam practiced, the political climate, and the socio-economic conditions shape the 
form of Islamic banking that is prevalent in the country.  Islamic banking in the Middle 
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East and Asia followed parallel, yet independent, tracks of development, while its 
development in the West came after the industry was firmly established in these regions.  
Overall, the Islamic financial products produced in the Middle East and North Africa tend 
to represent a stricter interpretation of shari’a, while those produced in Asia tend to be of 
a more liberal bent.  The West follows the basic capitalist tenet of supply meeting 
demand. 
A. STRUCTURE OF AN ISLAMIC BANK 
Depositors can make two types of deposits with Islamic banks:  transaction and 
investment.  A transaction account works like a conventional checking account where the 
face value of the amount is guaranteed, earns no interest, and incurs a service charge.  
Whereas a conventional bank will use deposit insurance as the guarantee against loss, an 
Islamic bank “guarantees” the value of the deposit by not using the money for any kind of 
risky investment.  The transaction side of an Islamic institution is essentially expected to 
hold 100 percent reserves.  The investment deposits are more important for an Islamic 
bank as they provide the funds for the bank’s profit and loss sharing (PLS) ventures.  
Unlike the secure transaction accounts, the investment accounts are shares or equity in 
the bank, with no fixed or promised rate of return, their value dependent upon the 
profitability of the bank which is based on the profitability of the bank’s joint ventures.  
The only guarantee an investment depositor has is the pre-arranged profit and loss ratio 
that is fixed for the life of the contract unless the bank and depositor mutually agree to 
alter the ratio. The depositors fall on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet, while the 
shares of the financed joint ventures make up the assets.  In theory, Islamic banks are 
deterred from investing in speculative ventures because the risk of loss is transferred 
from the entrepreneur to the lender.104 
As previously mentioned, the preferred methods of equity-based lending are 
mudaraba and musharaka.  Under a mudaraba agreement, the bank would provide the 
funding and the entrepreneur the management or technical expertise.  With a musharaka, 
the bank and the entrepreneurs both provide funding.  The primary tool used by Islamic 
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banks, however, is the murabaha, a consumption loan whereby the bank buys a product 
for a customer and sells it to him at cost plus a mark-up in compensation for the bank’s 
risk and time-value of money.  The borrower pays back the money in installments.  The 
mudaraba and musharaka are considered medium to long-term investments, while the 
murabaha is considered a short-term contract. 
Engaging in PLS investing carries with it additional costs not normally born by a 
conventional institution.  To begin with, the bank must do costly project appraisals since 
its profitability is based not merely on an entrepreneur’s use of the bank’s money but on 
the profitability of the investment.  It must go beyond the conventional bank’s 
requirement to investigate a borrower’s credit and collateral, engaging in costlier 
underwriting.  Additionally, the Islamic bank must oversee or audit projects as part of 
certain PLS schemes, adding costs that put Islamic banks at a disadvantage with respect 
to conventional banks.  These added financial liabilities are what push banks to utilize the 
low-maintenance murabaha over mudaraba and musharaka .105 
Ironically, Islamic banks, initially lacking experience and resources, relied heavily 
on the conventional international banking system for its very creation.  As the financial 
world went through significant transformations, the Islamic banks cooperated with 
Western banks through joint ventures, management agreements, technical cooperation, 
and correspondent banking in order to stay relevant and viable.  This resulted in increased 
collaboration and synergy between the conventional and Islamic financial worlds.  
Moreover, the major Islamic banking groups would rather remain in the global banking 
system rather than try to create a global Islamic network that would compete with the 
global conventional banking system.106 
The convergence of conventional and Islamic finance can be seen in five recent 
trends.  First, practically every conventional bank in the Islamic world offers their 
customers a choice between conventional or Islamic banking through Islamic subsidiaries 
and/or ‘Islamic windows’ in their conventional facilities.  Second, conventional 
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institutions outside of the Islamic world, such as Merrill Lynch, HSBC, and UBS, have 
created Islamic subsidiaries or offer Islamic products in the hope of catering to the 
Islamic middle classes.  Citicorp, for example, opened an Islamic subsidiary in Bahrain in 
1996.  Third, Islamic institutions, in an effort to attract non-Muslims, are creating 
products that are attractive credit-rated, medium-to-long term investment opportunities 
that are also shari’a compliant.  Fourth, Islamic banks have expanded to areas outside of 
the Islamic world to not only service local Islamic communities but also to participate in 
long-term industrial and infrastructure projects in parts of the non-Muslim world.  Fifth, 
conventional and Islamic institutions are cooperating in conducting much of the new 
ijtihad (legal reasoning) to develop new Islamic financial tools, often outside of the 
Islamic world.  Institutions like the National Commercial Bank, the Islamic Development 
Bank, Wellington Management, and Goldman Sachs, in partnership with members of the 
DMI group, are providing financing for groups like the aforementioned Harvard Islamic 
Financial Information Program (now known as the Islamic Finance Project, or IFP) 
which seeks to collate information on the Islamic financial sector, promote research and 
development of new strategies and methods of Islamic finance, and increase awareness 
and understanding of Islamic finance in both the Western and Muslim worlds.107 
B. ISLAMIC BANKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
The Islam practiced in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) tends to be of a 
more literal and strict variety than practiced in other parts of the world.  Additionally, the 
role of the ulama and Islamists and their relationships with the governments is unique.  
All three elements have directly influenced the ways in which Islamic banking has been 
developed and conducted in the region. 
1. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia has experienced something of a banking anomaly in the Middle 
East.  While the self-proclaimed Islamic country claims the shari’a as its constitution, 
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until recently the majority of the banking was conventional.  With the monarchy having 
much of its oil wealth deposited in domestic and overseas conventional bank accounts, it 
was hesitant to open the door to Islamic banking for fear of its populace questioning the 
ruling monarchy’s conventional banking endeavors, undermining its Islamic 
legitimacy.108  Although the aforementioned Ar-Rajhi Banking and Investment Company 
(ARABIC) began its Islamic financial operations in 1985, the National Commercial Bank 
(NCB), Saudi Arabia’s largest commercial bank, tested the Islamic banking market in 
1991 by making one of its conventional retail branches shari’a-compliant.  Demand for 
Islamic banking services reached such a level that by 2004 the government and the NCB 
decided to make all of its 260 retail branches shari’a-compliant.  The past decade has 
seen a rise in Islamic banking, from 30% of total banking at the end of 2000 to over 50% 
by the end of 2006.  Growth in this sector in Saudi Arabia has been so much greater than 
in the conventional sector that the latter may eventually be abandoned.109 
Although Saudi Arabia once heavily regulated its banking sector and tightly 
controlled foreign investment, the demand for shari’a-compliant banking services has 
increased growth and expansion overseas.  Not only is ARABIC opening another 160 
domestic branches (it currently operates 400 and 100 branches for male and female 
account holders, respectively), but it is also expanding overseas to Malaysia, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh.  Additionally, Saudi Arabia has begun to open its borders to competition 
- the National Bank of Kuwait opened a Saudi branch in 2006.  Although full 
liberalization is not planned in the near-term and the kingdom still strictly regulates 
foreign banking investors, the growth in Islamic banking in Saudi Arabia has made it the 
dominate sector in the country’s banking industry.110 
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2. Bahrain 
Since the Bahrain Islamic Bank was established in 1978, Bahrain has grown to 
enjoy the highest concentration of offshore Islamic financial institutions.  Bahrain’s 
journey to be the Gulf’s leader in offshore Islamic banking began in the 1970s when the 
Lebanese civil war left a regional banking vacuum.111  The Bahrain Monetary Agency 
has endeavored to promote Bahrain as an international financial center since the agency’s 
establishment in 1973, part of the country’s initiative to diversify away from its 
dwindling oil supplies.  In selling itself as a regional financial hub, Bahrain has touted its 
many competitive advantages, such as a skilled workforce, business-friendly 
environment, liberal currency exchanges, and, especially, a good regulatory system.  In 
addition to the issuance of best practice guidelines, modeled after the United Kingdom, in 
1997, all Bahraini banks must comply with the International Accounting Standards 
(IAS).112  Bahrain is solidifying its leading role in Islamic finance by hosting multilateral 
regulatory institutions that endeavor to set the standards for Islamic finance:  the 
Accounting and Auditing Organizations for Islamic Financial Institutions, the Liquidity 
Management Center, the Islamic International Rating Agency, and the International 
Islamic Financial Market.113  Currently, 50 of Bahrain’s 391 licensed financial firms are 
Islamic, while an additional 20 conventional banks offer shari’a-compliant services.114 
3. Kuwait 
The Kuwait Finance House (KFH), established in 1977, is the sole Islamic Bank 
in Kuwait, but it has captured 15 percent of the Islamic financial market in the region, 
placing Kuwait among the top three countries in terms of Islamic share of commercial 
bank deposits.  Not merely a financial endeavor, the KFH is the product of Islamists’ 
efforts to expand their influence, representing a synergy of economic activity and Islamist 
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politics, resulting in an institutional expression of Kuwait’s Islamic movement.  The KFH 
enjoys substantial government support, originally established with a 49 percent 
government share in capital, the present share being nearly 60 percent.  The alliance 
between the government, the ruling al Sabah family, and the Islamists was formed as a 
counter to the de-facto alliance of the pan-Arab opposition and the large Palestinian 
expatriate community working in Kuwait in the 1970s.  With encouragement from the 
Egyptian Islamists, Kuwaiti Islamic entrepreneurs finally prevailed upon the Kuwaiti 
government to allow them to establish the interest-free financial institution in 1977.115 
The KFH captured the market of Kuwait’s conservative population and middle 
class by emphasizing the Islamic bank’s interest-free services and criticizing the 
country’s conventional banks for exploiting the Kuwaiti consumers of their limited 
income.  The KFH was also able to attract a large number of its customers who were 
lower-income earners due to it not having minimum balance requirements.  This 
translated into a large percentage of Kuwait’s citizens banking at the KFH.  Many of 
these lower-income Kuwaitis were the Bedouin, an oft-neglected, yet important, 
constituency.  This penetration of the Bedouin market correlated with Islamist penetration 
of Kuwait’s outer, more tribal districts, shifting the Islamist constituency from the urban 
to the tribal centers.116 
4. Sudan 
The complete Islamization of all banking in Sudan began when Jaafar al Nimeiri 
and his “Free Officers” seized power in 1959.  Although a Nasserist in ideology, an 
attempted communist coup in 1971 realigned al Nimeiri’s political views, transforming 
this initially secular leader into an Islamist.  The constitution of 1973 reflected his 
leanings, stating that all legislation shall be based on Islamic law and custom. The 
Muslim Brothers became closely associated with the Sudanese government when Nimeiri 
signed the National Reconciliation Pact in 1978, enabling them to successfully compete 
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for parliamentary seats.117  The national banking system, however, was conventional and 
disliked by many Sudanese Muslims for its interest-based operations.  The Faisal Islamic 
Bank of Sudan (FIBS) was the first solely Islamic bank in Sudan.  Established in 1978, 
the bank pursued an aggressive growth strategy and enjoyed an annual average growth 
rate of 70 percent, even as it deducted a 10 percent zakat from net profits for distribution 
to the poor.  FIBS’ strong growth encouraged the establishment of more Islamic banks in 
Sudan, though some were Islamic in name only.118  The proclaimed “Islamic revolution” 
of 8 September 1983 Islamized Sudanese society, with guidelines enacted in December 
requiring that the entire banking system be shari’a-compliant, outlawing interest.  
Additionally, the Zakat Tax Act of 1984 empowered the government to levy, collect, and 
distribute zakat, replacing the majority of the country’s tax system.  Although this 
legislation also created other Islamic banks, the transformation of the banking industry 
was inconsistent due to the haphazard nature of the Islamization process.119  Moreover, 
although courts were forbidden to enforce interest-based contracts, conventional banking 
continued much as before.120 
In spite of the early success of the FIBS, overall banking performance has been 
dismal due to such factors as the horrible performance of the Sudanese economy through 
the 1990s and financial abuse by members of banks’ boards of directors.  Although the 
Bank of Sudan’s Shari’a Council has made attempts to increase bank supervision, the 
reforms came too late to make an appreciable difference.  While Sudan’s experience with 
Islamic finance can not be called an economic success, politically it can be considered a 
success in that the country’s banking law is based on Islamic principles.121 
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C. ISLAMIC BANKING IN ASIA 
Although Islamic banking in Asia developed with the Middle East, the region’s 
more liberal interpretation of Islam, along with the use of banking as a tool for 
development rather than Islamization, directly impacted its underlying philosophy and 
financial products. 
1. Malaysia 
Malaysia’s Islamic financial institutions, like many in Southeast Asia, are 
significant for two reasons:  Islamic and conventional banking systems function side-by-
side, and Islam is combined with high technology and finance to achieve economic 
growth.  Islam plays a seemingly paradoxical role in the Malaysian government in that 
the constitution of the secular government recognizes the primary position of Islam at the 
same time that it guarantees freedom of religion.  While the dominant political party 
comprises Muslim Malays, Malaysia’s Islam as practiced by its people is known for its 
tolerance and pragmatism, though strict traditionalists still wield influence.122 
Mahathir Mohammed, a physician who ascended to prime minister in 1982, 
engineered Malaysia’s transformation from an agricultural-based economy to an Asian 
“tiger.”  His plan was to use Islam and its unique local emphasis on development, 
combined with such influences as nationalism, capitalism, and “Asian values,” as a 
means by which to achieve growth, modernization, and financial innovation.  In 
particular, he wanted to develop an Islamic financial system that would propel Kuala 
Lumpur into an international financial center.  Often at odds with the more literal-minded 
ulama who wished to argue over details, Mahathir felt that Islam needed to be interpreted 
in a way to make it more relevant in the modern world.123  He challenged the ulama to a 
new ijtihad that would adopt a more innovative approach, pushing them to create Islamic 
financial products that in effect mirrored the latest global financial products.  Islamic 
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research centers and universities, such as the International Islamic University and the 
Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding, endeavored to legitimate modern finance, 
sending the message that industrialization and productivity were permissible under 
Islam.124 
The Malaysian government introduced Islamic banking as part of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) strategy to assist the Muslim Malays who were bitter that their 
Chinese counterparts dominated the business sector and seemed to enjoy significant 
economic advantage.125  Islamic banking was more than a form of patronage to mollify 
the Muslim Malays, however; it served as the primary means of Malaysia’s development 
and financial modernization.126  Although there were earlier experiments in Islamic 
finance in Malaysia (such as the Muslim Pilgrims Savings Corporation in 1963, evolving 
into the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board in 1969 - both designed to assist Muslims 
in performing the hajj), Parliament established the country’s first Islamic bank by passing 
the Islamic Banking Act (IBA) in 1983, creating the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
(BIMB).  Controlled by the government, the requirement to adhere to Islamic principles, 
rules, and practices is contained in the bank’s associating memorandum.127 
In addition to establishing the BIMB, the IBA provided Malaysia’s central bank, 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), with the authority to supervise and regulate Islamic banks 
as it does with other licensed banks.  Parliament also passed the Government Investment 
Act of 1983 enabling the Malaysian government to issue shari’a-compliant Government 
Investment Certificates (GICs).  Regarded as liquid assets, GICs provided Islamic banks 
a means to meet prescribed liquidity requirements and invest surplus funds.  Increased 
governance of this nascent industry came in 1996 with an amendment to the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) 1989.  While the original law regulated conventional 
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financial institutions, from banks to non-bank sources of credit and finance, the 1996 
amendment allowed previously-licensed banks to conduct Islamic banking business.128 
The BIMB has been at the forefront of Islamic financial innovation - it established 
the Islamic insurance company Syarikat Takaful Malaysia in 1995, issued corporate 
sukuk in 1990, and created various credit and financing facilities.  During this time, the 
government took an active role in developing Malaysia’s role as a financial center, 
establishing the dual banking system in 1993 which permitted conventional banks to offer 
Islamic and conventional banking services under the same roof.  Always encouraging the 
development of Islamic innovations that mirrored conventional products, during the 
1990s the Malaysian government established a number of institutions and products with 
the intention of making Malaysia the leading Islamic financial center: 
• a secondary market for banking products; 
 
• an Islamic capital market in Kuala Lumpur; 
 
• the indices and benchmarks for companies that adhere to Islamic 
principles; and 
 
• shari’a-compliant home mortgages and credit cards.129 
 
With Mahathir’s urging, the BNM established the National Shari’a Advisory 
Council (NSAC) in 1997 to avoid discord among rival Islamic schools of thought and 
lend legitimacy to Malaysia serving as the hub for Islamic finance.130  The primary duties 
of the NSAC are to serve as the sole advisory authority to the BNM on Islamic banking 
operations and to evaluate new Islamic products created by Islamic banks for shari’a 
compliance.  While the Malaysian government has encouraged Islamic banks to choose 
their own approach to interpret Islamic law in the development of financial products, 
unlike Islamic banking in the Middle East the NASC has endeavored to ensure overall 
shari’a compliance and standardization, benefiting Malaysia’s Islamic banking sector in 
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general.  Also lending legitimacy to Malaysia’s financial products, the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) was established in Kuala Lumpur in 2002 under the sponsorship  
of the International Monetary Fund.  The IFSB is an association of central banks, 
monetary authorities, and other institutions chartered with regulating the Islamic financial 
services industry.131  
Currently, there are ten wholly Islamic banks and 13 conventional banks that offer 
Islamic products and services, comprising a total of 548 branches throughout the 
country.132  Along with interest-free banking, Malaysia has been operating an Islamic 
debt securities market since 1990, an Islamic Interbank Money Market since 1994, and an 
Islamic equity market since 1995.133  As of May 2007, Islamic banking assets have 
grown to $34B, equaling 13% of the market.134 
2. Indonesia 
Despite Indonesia having the world’s largest population of Muslims, Islamic 
banking135 got a late start in Indonesia due to the local practice of Islam and political 
factors.  Ever since Islam’s introduction into the region, Indonesia practiced the faith in a 
way that differed greatly from that practiced on the Arabian Peninsula, incorporating 
elements of pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhism into the local Islamic customs.  This divergence 
in orthopraxy resulted in a more liberal interpretation of shari’a136 - many secular 
intellectuals disagree with the prevalent belief held by Indonesian Islamic jurists that the 
riba forbidden by the Qur’an is the same as the modern interest charged by conventional 
banks.  The majority of Indonesian Muslims seem to be indifferent.137 
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Indonesia’s political secularism is reflected in the country’s secular constitution 
which recognizes a single God, but neither Allah nor Islam is mentioned.138  
Additionally, the Indonesian government has long regarded Islamism with suspicion.  
After communism, President Suharto had long considered militant Islam as his next 
biggest threat.139  Suharto’s opposition to political Islam softened, however, with the rise 
of an Islamist opposition, and he began courting religious leaders and the more devout 
Indonesians, supporting the public’s demand for a new Islamic banking system.   
Indonesia’s first Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) opened in 1992 and has 
spearheaded the development of an Islamic financial center in Indonesia.140  Islamic 
banking operations were laid out in the Act No. 72 of 1992 and further advanced in the 
Act No. 10 of 1998, including the establishment of the dual banking system.141  Between 
1992 and 1998 there were 78 rural Islamic banks and one commercial Islamic bank in 
operation.142 
Bank Indonesia (BI) entered the world of Islamic banking with the passage of Act 
No. 23 in 1999.  Like Malaysia’s BNM, BI is the regulatory authority for conventional 
and Islamic banking in Indonesia and has taken the lead in developing the industry.  
Mandated by the Banking Act to establish a sound Islamic banking system, BI has 
established an Islamic Banking Development Committee to oversee the development of 
the industry and codify a more comprehensive set of Islamic banking regulations.  In its 
“Blueprint of Islamic Banking Development in Indonesia,” BI has laid out a plan that 
would ensure better shari’a compliance, improve competitiveness, and adopt 
international standards for Islamic banking services.143 
                                                 
138 Warde, 213. 
139 Ariff. 
140 Warde, 214. 
141 Venardos, 177. 
142 Bank Indonesia, “The blueprint of Islamic banking development in Indonesia,” September 2002, 
http://www.bi.go.id/NR/rdonlyres/9170EE41-7D9A-4376-B520-
A6B3A0945153/1331/syariah_bprintengl.pdf: 4. 
143 Ibid., 2. 
 48
In spite of annual growth exceeding 75%, Islamic banking constitutes less than 
1% of the banking market share in Indonesia.  Still in its infancy, Islamic banking in 
Indonesia is going to face numerous challenges as it tries to grow and compete 
internationally:  lack of a complete regulatory and supervisory framework, limited market 
coverage, limited institutional expertise in Islamic banking, operational inefficiency, 
market domination by conventional financing, and compliance with international Islamic 
banking standards.144  Although there are predictions that Indonesia is the “sleeping 
giant” that will capture 5% of the market share by 2010,145 this sector in the world’s most 
populace Muslim nation is still in its embryonic stage of development and influence. 
3. Pakistan 
Pakistan’s experience with Islamic banking has been paradoxical.  Pakistani 
Islamic economists like Mawdudi advanced the idea of Islamic finance during the 1950s, 
and the idea for the creation of an Islamic bank was adopted during an Islamic summit 
conference in Lahore.  Ironically, Pakistan, also a self-described Islamic country, has not 
been successful in adhering to the prohibition of riba in its banking.  Although the 
Pakistani constitution requires that the government operate an interest-free economy and 
financial system, the government has only made a half-hearted attempt to comply.  
Following the orders of President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, in 1980 the Council of Islamic 
Ideology (CII) created the blueprint for an interest-free economy, warning that it would 
not function without the restructuring of personal and state institutions along Islamic 
lines.  Not only did this not happen, but President Zia took action countering his order by 
mandating a ten-year ban (1980-1990) on the Federal Shariah Court (FSC) ruling against 
government transactions involving interest.  Additionally, the State Bank of Pakistan 
(SPB) permitted financial institutions to invest income from their interest-free, PLS 
activities in interest-bearing government securities.146  Moreover, foreign currency 
deposits, foreign loans, and government debt still fell under the purview of conventional 
                                                 
144 Indonesia, “The blueprint of Islamic banking development in Indonesia,” 5, 9. 
145 Venardos, 185. 
146 Mohammad Mansoor Khan and M. Ishaq Bhatti, “Why interest-free banking and finance 
movement failed in Pakistan,” Humanomics, 22, 3 (2006): 146-147. 
 49
banking.  The Pakistani authorities endeavored to not disrupt the operations of the 
existing banking structure with the Islamic banking guidelines.147   
Even after the expiration of the moratorium on decisions that might prohibit 
interest, the government continued to make only half-hearted attempts to Islamize the 
banking center, primarily as a means of placating Islamist opposition.148  In 1992 the 
FSC ruled as un-Islamic any interest paid or charged by any financial institution.  The 
government followed in 1998 with the elimination of riba from the country’s economy, at 
least in principle.149  Again, however, the government had no intention of making its 
banking system interest-free as it relied on conventional banks for funding.150 
There are a number of reasons that Islamic banking in Pakistan never fulfilled the 
potential that many Islamic economists had hoped it would.  First, the government 
viewed the promotion of Islamic banking as a political tool, never intending to do away 
with the conventional system that was a crucial source of government funding.  After 
having undergone reforms in the early 1990s to attract foreign capital, policy makers 
were not about to take actions that might precipitate foreign capital flight.  Deep in debt, 
the government would not risk not meeting its financial obligations to foreign 
governments and other creditors due to a loss of foreign trade, investments, and capital 
inflow that might accompany the abolishment of interest from the Pakistani economy.151   
Second, the government’s lack of enthusiasm for Islamizing the economy 
discouraged the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), responsible for the regulation of the 
monetary and credit system and the de facto backroom office of the Ministry of Finance, 
to take the steps necessary to implement such a change.  Additionally, the lack of a 
discount rate would deprive the SBP of the monetary tool for maintaining price stability 
and controlling the exchange rate.152  Third, investors and banks were hesitant to engage 
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in the PLS method of Islamic banking, where most of the debt instruments were simply 
mark-up schemes that resembled conventional finance.  Depositors and bankers alike 
were also risk averse and more focused on the short term.153  Bankers were reluctant to 
enter into PLS agreements with businesses that kept two sets of accounting books in 
order to avoid an excessive tax burden, and business owners tended to be private about 
their operations.154 
In spite of these past lukewarm efforts, Islamic banking is attempting to keep a 
toehold in Pakistan.  Currently, Islamic banks’ share of the market is well below three 
percent, but the SPB will be issuing an Islamic equivalent of treasury bills that will be an 
important investment opportunity for six Islamic banks that have been licensed in 
Pakistan.  Based on the government’s past disinterest in Islamic banking, with the 
exception of its use as a political tool, any growth in this nascent industry will be due to 
the interest of pious Muslims from the Middle East looking for investment opportunities.  
In addition to property developments in Karachi and Islamabad, the Dubai Islamic Bank 
is looking to establish 50 branches in Pakistan over the next three years.155 
D. ISLAMIC BANKING IN THE WEST 
The West has been mixed in its reception of Islamic banking.  While it may have 
not had a problem with it culturally, the regulatory regimes of some countries have been 
friendlier than others to Islamic banking.  Fortunately western financial corporations have 
not been bound by these regulations when investing in the Islamic financial industry in 
MENA and Asia. 
1. The United Kingdom 
In addition to conventional Western banks opening Islamic windows in Muslim 
countries, these same banks have been answering the demand by Muslims in their home 
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countries. With such heavies as HSBC and Lloyds offering Islamic financial services, 
London has grown into the center for Islamic banking in the West, to the point of rivaling 
the market shares of Bahrain, Dubai, and Malaysia.  The United Kingdom leads all other 
Islamic financial centers in the volume of commodity murabaha, will be the first western 
country to issue a sakk, has already established a secondary market for this instrument, 
and is creating Islamic hedge funds.  In addition to providing a liberal banking 
environment, the government is changing its laws to make the regulatory environment 
more Islamic-banking friendly.  Having lifted the double stamp duty on Islamic 
residential mortgages and property loans, legislation is also in the works that would give 
companies issuing sukuk the same tax relief as companies issuing conventional bonds.156 
The banking sector is embracing this burgeoning financial industry, with the Bank 
of England, the UK’s central bank, issuing a directive to banks to develop shari’a-
compliant financial products and loosening prior banking restrictions that made Islamic 
banking difficult.157  With such changes, banks from the Middle East are beginning to 
use the UK as a beachhead for further expansion into the European Union.  The UK’s 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) recently granted operating licenses to the Islamic 
Bank of Britain (IBB), Europe’s first stand-alone Islamic bank, and the European Islamic 
Investment Bank, both of which are backed by Islamic financial institutions in Qatar and 
Bahrain.  Western rating agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, are also 
engaged in the nascent industry, giving shari’a-compliant institutions and instruments 
standard ratings that reflect the credit risk for investors unfamiliar with Islamic 
finance.158 
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2. The United States 
Other parts of the West, in spite of large Muslim populations, have not been as 
quick to embrace Islamic financial institutions.  In particular, in the United States there 
are state and federal laws that preclude many operations typical of Islamic institutions, 
such as banks directly owning real estate or owning shares in a company to which they 
are lending money.159  Additionally, the Truth in Lending Act requires that the interest 
rate of a financial product be disclosed, the notion of which goes against shari’a.  While 
Islamic products and services are offered in the United States, there have been no strictly 
Islamic banks established under the existing state and federal regulations.  The regulatory 
regimes for the states and federal government are sufficiently different that Islamic 
financial institutions will want to research their potential banking supervisory agencies to 
determine under which one they would want to operate as some more than others will be 
more flexible about molding a regulatory regime around unconventional banking 
practices.  Although a financial company may conduct shari’a-compliant banking 
operations, it is not a “bank” until it meets the statutory and regulatory banking 
requirements.  Moreover, such an institution may not legally accept deposits until it has 
received a charter under these requirements.  An exception to the aforementioned 
restriction on banks owning real estate would be the savings association, which is 
permitted to use subsidiary servicing companies to enter into joint ventures and own 
property.160 
An additional regulatory requirement is the insurance of deposited funds by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  While transaction accounts that contain 
funds separate from PLS ventures can adhere to this regulatory requirement, insuring 
investment funds could be problematic as risk must be shared between the two parties in 
order to be compliant with shari’a.  Although it would be hard for the FDIC and the 
relevant regulatory authority, without legislative intervention, to issue a charter to a bank 
that does not insure such deposits against loss, there is a possibility for compromise along 
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the lines as that enjoyed by the United Kingdom’s IBB.  The IBB satisfied both secular 
and religious requirements by offering to reimburse any losses incurred by an investment 
account, an opportunity that a devout depositor is able to decline in order to be compliant 
with shari’a.  Until there is an industry-wide shari’a supervisory board, eagerness to  
make such a compromise may vary from one board to another.  Additionally, regulators 
will be walking a fine line in keeping church separated from state when they start delving 
in matters that could involve religion.161 
Islamic banking has expanded into a transnational industry, with once country-
specific banks operating internationally. The success of such expansions is not solely 
dependent upon good business practices, however, but on customers’ interpretations of 
Islam.   The disparity in shari’a interpretation between the stricter Gulf and the more 
liberal Malaysia is the major obstacle to international standardization, according to 
Khalid Hamd, executive director of banking supervision at the Central Bank of Bahrain.  
The market will favor the GCC, however, due to its abundance of wealth, allowing 
shari’a interpretations from GCC institutions to set the international standard for 
structuring Islamic financial instruments.  This global industry is not without its 
weaknesses, however, and its opportunities, as will be explored in the next chapter. 
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IV. LIABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
While at first glance the benefits of Islamic finance might seem to bring stability 
and a more equitable distribution of wealth within a society, there are weaknesses in how 
it is currently practiced that could undermine its long-term viability.  Criticisms of the 
system include unfulfilled expectations, structural corruptibility, insufficient regulation, 
and political abuse.  In spite of these weaknesses, Islamic banking can play a role in 
moderating Islamist movements that begs exploration. 
A. ENHANCED FINANCIAL STABILITY 
Three areas have been identified as needing special attention for strengthening the 
international financial architecture that affects financial stability:  enhancing transparency 
and accountability, strengthening domestic financial systems, and managing international 
financial crises.  Transparency and accountability will be improved through strengthening 
regulations and supervision, increasing market discipline, and implement international 
standards.  Risk management is the key to strengthening domestic financial systems and 
managing international financial crises.  More specifically, the Working Group on 
International Financial Crises recommended risk-sharing schemes whereby governments 
of emerging markets encourage risk-sharing contracts between debtors and creditors.162  
Islamic economists like Sayyid Abul-Ala Mawdudi, Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, and 
Muhammad Taqi Usmani would say that such advocated profit sharing is at the heart of 
Islamic banking.   
Islamic economists criticize conventional banking’s debt financing because a 
seemingly unlimited deposit insurance system socializes loss and permits the 
privatization of gain.163  They also extol the virtue of its profit and loss sharing financial 
arrangements, specifically making three claims regarding interest-free banking enhancing 
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financial stability.  First, depositors with investment accounts in an Islamic bank share in 
the bank’s losses, encouraging the depositors to remain vigilant about the bank’s 
endeavors.  Second, the tying of debt instruments to real assets precludes the mass 
movements of funds that can accompany the potentially destabilizing speculation in 
interest-based, short-term debt typical of conventional banking.  Having money assigned 
to specific goods and services constrains excessive credit expansion.  Third, debt crises 
are less likely to occur in an interest-free financial system due to the total value of the 
debt being set when the contract is established - the total value can not increase because 
there is not compound interest accruing on the outstanding balance.  Additionally, there is 
little room for fraud because there is an identified asset tied to the loan.164 
Islamic financiers further view their system superior to conventional venture 
capitalism because they do not rely merely on demonstrated credit worthiness.  
Proponents of Islamic banking argue that decisions regarding loans are based on overall 
project profitability and would not avoid a sound project simply because it would not turn 
a profit immediately.  They view this ability to look at projects with a longer timeline as 
contributing to the more efficient allocation of credit.  
B. CRITICISM AND CONCERNS 
1. Incongruent Goals and Results 
Islamic banks have fallen short of their initial socio-economic goals of 
distributing wealth and raising the poorer elements of Muslim society.  Government 
support and privileges notwithstanding, Islamic banks have proven rather risk-averse, 
foregoing many PLS instruments in favor of more short-term financial products like 
murabaha at the expense of investments in agriculture or industry.165  Islamic banks tend 
to go with established producers and merchants, favoring the more low-risk but lucrative 
trade and commodity financing to project financing, having suffered from a lack of talent 
capable of accurately assessing project risk.  Entrepreneurs have also concealed risk from 
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the Islamic bank from which it is pursuing funds.166  Additionally, the goal of eliminating 
interest has proven somewhat illusory, especially when involving relations with the non-
Muslim world.  While Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan attempted to fully-Islamicize their 
economies, their massive interest-bearing foreign debts prevented them from doing so.167 
Moreover, the many benefits associated with Islamic finance, such as it helps in 
redistributing wealth to the poor and its economic norms facilitate the removal of 
opportunism and corruption from the modern economic system, are rarely challenged or 
undergo the critical analysis typical of other economic programs.  There are a number of 
reasons for this softer handling.  First, the Islamic financial system is not taken seriously 
and is therefore not viewed as a threat to the conventional financial system.  Second, an 
overall combined knowledge of economic theory, Islam, and the historic and 
contemporary Muslim world is lacking, the paucity of which precludes an evaluation of 
an economic program inspired and influenced by these areas.  Third, the issue of cultural 
relativism discourages the challenge of what some would consider an “expression of 
authenticity” but others claim is an “invented tradition.”168  Given that the rise of Islamic 
economics had its roots in political rather than economic grievances, there should be little 
surprise that Islamic finance has failed in solving the major economic problems of 
Muslim countries.169 
2. Islamic Moral Hazard  
The traditional notion of moral hazard as it relates to financial regulation has been 
associated with policies that may encourage reckless or dishonest behavior.  There can 
also be identified an “Islamic moral hazard” in that certain aspects of Islamic banking 
may be susceptible to unscrupulous conduct, specifically comprising four factors.  First, 
the assumption of righteous behavior by employees and customers can attract more 
feckless characters.  This was especially a problem during the infancy of Islamic banking 
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when many PLS schemes proved disastrous, bankers having adopted the Islamic 
economists’ assumption that all Islamic entrepreneurs were good Muslims.  Even as late 
as 1998, the Dubai Islamic Bank suffered scandals involving its employees and improper 
loan practices.170  The increased scrutiny that will accompany adopting international 
banking regulations and Islamic banking-specific regulations should help to alleviate the 
consequences of such attempts at dishonesty in the future. 
A second factor of Islamic moral hazard is the use of religion by Islamic 
institutions to avoid scrutiny or criticism.  Until recently, the Islamic financial industry 
was believed to be above the need for regulation due to the intrinsic morality of it being 
shari’a-compliant.  A third factor is the potential for ambiguity when attempting to marry 
economics and shari’a.  In contrast to the secular system, the economic and religious 
logic incorporated in Islam’s legal system encourages patience and even loan forgiveness 
to delinquent borrowers.  Late fees or penalties are often unenforceable, with collecting 
on bad loans made even more difficult in many Muslim countries by multi-layered legal 
systems.   The fourth factor, also tied to inadequate regulation, involves the relationship 
between banks and depositors.  Although investment account holders are not promised a 
fixed rate of return they expect a competitive one.   Banks are compelled to accommodate 
this expectation out of a fear of losing business, doing so by changing the profit 
distribution ratios in favor of investment account holders over shareholders.  Egypt’s 
International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development faced such a quandary in the 
late 1980s, and not only distributed all profits to investment account holders, but went so 
far as to make distributions in excess of its net profits.  Without strict regulatory controls, 
such activities could continue.171 
3. Arbitrage and Innovation  
An inherent weakness of Islamic finance’s over-emphasis on premodern contract 
forms is its potential exploitation by rent-seeking legal arbitrageurs, resulting in a kind of 
shari’a arbitrage.  Shari’a arbitrage would be a regulatory arbitrage whereby a financial 
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product available in one market would be restructured under what is perceived as Islamic 
law in order to make it available in another.172  This adherence to premodern contract 
forms results in efficiency losses which are justified as a necessary expense of the 
Islamization process.  Moreover, the emphasis on contract mechanics and certification of 
shari’a compliance by shari’a supervisory boards is at the expense of efficiency and fair 
pricing.  As long as Islamic finance continues to focus on form over substance, such 
inefficiencies could eventually undermine the growth of this nascent industry that was 
initiated, though not necessarily sustained, by piety.173     
Constructing an Islamic financial product begins with a conventional product for 
which there is no Islamic alternative.  Bankers, ulama, and lawyers work together to 
reengineer the conventional product to make it shari’a-compliant, endeavoring to make it 
compatible with legal and regulatory systems by making it “as similar as possible to the 
conventional product with which regulators are familiar.”174  There is a deliberate 
discussion involving the tradeoff between efficiency and perceived Islamic credibility, 
specifically as it pertains to the use of premodern contract labels.  In fact, an important 
step in the execution of this shari’a arbitrage is choosing the appropriate Arabic name for 
the new product, preferably one widely used in classical Islamic jurisprudence, in order 
to lend legitimacy to the new product.  In deviating from the original conventional 
product, a special purpose vehicle, usually associated with a sakk, or other “superfluous 
financial transactions,” may be required in order to sufficiently change the new product 
from its origin and make it sufficiently Islamic.  Such activity increases transaction costs 
and reduces efficiency.  The kind of Islam practiced in the target market, Sudan versus 
Malaysia, for example, will determine the degree of tradeoff between credibility and 
efficiency and how the Islamic product will be structured.  In spite of all of these efforts 
to Islamize the new product, rates of return are often tied to the conventional LIBOR.175 
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Islamic finance is rarely completely unattached to conventional finance and the 
degrees of separation that are used to separate the Muslim customers from interest-
bearing products resembles the layering techniques of money launderers and criminal 
financiers.  Additionally, offshore financial centers are also used to minimize the 
incorporation costs of SPVs and tax burdens.  The lack of a unified regulatory framework 
for Islamic finance, coupled with the lack of sophistication of regulatory and law 
enforcement in many of the countries in which Islamic finance is centered as compared to 
its western counterparts, leaves it more susceptible to abuse by criminal elements.  In 
particular, there is a lack of transparency associated with the degrees of separation often 
utilized in Islamic banking.  While Islamic bankers may have no interest in participating 
in any illicit activity regarding criminal or terrorist financing, the criminal financiers have 
experience in the techniques that are similar to the mechanics of shari’a arbitrage that 
may allow them to exploit the insufficiently-regulated industry.176 
4. Operating in a Conventional International System 
The first 25 years of Islamic banking (1975-2000) was plagued by excess liquidity 
with no means to easily move funds between banks, a convenience enjoyed by the 
conventional banking industry through such instruments as treasury bills (T-bills), other 
tradable securities, and overnight inter-bank loans and transfers.  The Bahrain Monetary 
Agency created the first Islamic T-bill in 2000, a non-tradable sukuk al salam, and in the 
following year introduced the first tradable Islamic debt security based on a bundle of 
shari’a-compliant leases, a sukuk al ijara.  In 2002, Malaysia created an internationally-
tradable sakk that was rated by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s and complied with U.S. 
regulations pertaining to conventional global bonds. In the following years, Islamic bonds 
were issued by the Islamic Development Bank, Qatar, Kuwait, Dubai, and the German 
state of Saxony-Anhalt, culminating in the creation of the Dow Jones Citigroup Sukuk 
Index on April 2, 2006.  Unfortunately, efficiency is sacrificed as SPVs are used in the  
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formation of the complex financial package that creates contracts which on the surface 
are shari’a board certified, but in reality is merely a complex iteration of a conventional 
bond issue.177 
Although Islamic banks are enjoying the fruits of their burgeoning industry, they 
may feel more of a squeeze by their conventional competitors in the coming years.  
Whereas strictly Islamic banks were the vanguard of producing shari’a-compliant 
products, conventional banks are beginning to produce new products at a faster rate.  
Conventional institutions enjoy the advantage of their strategic decision-making process, 
being able to engage in a process of experimentation while their Islamic counterparts 
must receive clearance from a shari’a board before they can introduce new products and 
services.178  While nearly all of the 300 Islamic banks operating in 75 countries are 
associated with or consult shari’a advisory boards, there are no international standards 
for shari’a compliance.  The lack of consensus creates a wide disparity between what is 
considered a sufficiently Islamic financial instrument across countries and regions based 
on the traditions of Islam practiced in those areas.179 
5. Regulations and Organizations 
Existing banking regulation was constructed for conventional finance in 
industrialized countries.  Since Islamic banking is often conducted in emerging markets, 
usually lacking a sufficient regulatory framework and suffering from structural problems, 
it has found fitting into existing regulatory frameworks rather difficult.  However, a 
number of factors are encouraging Islamic banking to fall under the international 
regulatory framework: the spread of liberal ideology, or the “Washington Consensus,” 
which advocates free and open markets and fiscal discipline; the expanded role of 
emerging markets in the global economy and the concomitant penetration of international 
financial institutions in these markets; and such financial turmoil as banking and currency 
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crises.  The increased exposure of banks and investment funds in emerging markets has 
precipitated an expectation that all countries will adopt norms such as the “Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” issued in 1997 by the Basel Committee.180 
The central bank governors of the G10 countries and Switzerland and 
Luxembourg created the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision in December 
1974 in response to the failures of Franklin National Bank in New York and Bankhaus 
Herstatt in West Germany.  The Basel Committee has produced a number of regulatory 
documents since its creation that have increased cooperation among bank supervisors and 
established international standards.  The Basel Accord of 12 July 1988 produced joint 
regulations affecting a minimum capital-to-assets ratio and capital classification, each 
subject to different rules.  The committee has also addressed risk-minimization strategies, 
and in 1992 established the following four principles for cross-border banking 
supervision: 
1. all international banks should be supervised by a home country that is capable of 
performing cross-border supervision; 
 
2. the creation of a cross-border banking establishment should receive the prior 
consent of both the host country and the home country authority; 
 
3. home country authorities should possess the right to gather information from their 
cross-border banking establishments; and 
 
4. if the host country determines that any of these three standards is not being met, it 
could impose restrictive measures or prohibit the establishment of banking 
offices.181 
 
As a result of increased international banking crises, the G7 petitioned the Basel 
Committee for more detailed guidelines, specifically looking for more cooperation, 
transparency, and risk containment among banks and supervisors.  In response to this 
entreaty, the committee issued, in close cooperation with 15 emerging market countries, 
the 25 Core Principles in 1997.  It contained the following items: 
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• all banks must have comprehensive risk management systems as well as 
management information systems that enable management to identify 
concentrations within their portfolio; 
 
• supervisors must set prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single 
borrowers or groups of related borrowers; 
 
• supervisors must determine that banks have adequate policies, practices and 
procedures in place, including strict “know-your-customer” rules that promote 
high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the 
bank being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements; and 
 
• regulators must be able to supervise the banking group on a worldwide 
consolidated basis.182 
 
Adopting the 25 Core Principles has proved somewhat problematic for the 
developing world in general and the Islamic world in particular.  Although the Basel 
Committee initially considered having two sets of regulations, one for developed 
countries and one for emerging countries, the committee decided to adopt a single 
regulation for all.  Although Malaysia and Indonesia were nominally involved with the 
construction of the new regulatory framework, most Islamic countries have had difficulty 
implementing the regulations due to institutional, cultural, political, and religious 
obstacles.  In addition to Islamic banking supervisors feeling that they are sufficiently 
different from conventional banking to not be governed by the same standards, 
compliance is nearly impossible from the standpoint of ownership and control, 
specifically with respect to the requirement of home country regulation.  Transnational 
groups like Prince Mohammad al-Faisal As-Saud’s Dar al-Maal al-Islami (DMI) or the 
Dallah al Baraka group own or control the majority of Islamic banks.  The Saudi prince 
headquarters his operations in the Bahamas, runs it network out of banks out of Geneva, 
and extends his operations in all parts of the Islamic world except Saudi Arabia.183 
Internal risk management can be problematic to Islamic bankers.  Shari’a boards 
tend not to address this religiously-delicate matter, especially as it relates to risk-reducing 
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financial instruments or deposit insurance.  As a result, Islamic banks are unable to meet 
regulators’ requirements for risk-management strategies.  Regulations like the U.S. 
Truth-in-Lending Act, which requires banks report an “annual percentage rate” in its 
disclosure statements, are also problematic due to the widely-held belief among ulama 
that the Qur’an forbids interest.  There is also a cultural barrier to such laws pertaining to 
disclosure due to the tendency to not discuss financial matters openly in many Muslim 
societies.  This penchant for privacy can extend to locales where “fronts” that might 
conceal bank ownership are not assumed to be of nefarious intent.184 
Ahmed Mohamed Ali argues that Islamic banking is effective in combating 
terrorist financing due to its overall regulatory environment being more stringent than the 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), 
especially with the self-regulation of complying with shari’a.  He further contends that 
the industry is inherently stable due to it being entirely asset-backed.185  In spite of Ali’s 
assertion that the Islamic banking system is sufficiently regulated, according to a 
McKinsey consultant there will be only national strongholds and no international Islamic 
banking markets until all banks abide by overarching standards.186  Additionally, the 
risks associated with Islamic banking are sufficiently similar to conventional banking as 
to warrant a similar regulatory framework.187  Toward this effort, a number of institutions 
have been established to regulate and bring the infrastructure of the Islamic financial 
industry closer to the conventional financial industry.  These include, but are not limited 
to, the following: 
• Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) 
• Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
• International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA) 
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• International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) 
• Liquidity Management Center (LMC) 
• General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBFI) 
The AAOIFI, which introduced its first regulations in 1993, works on two levels.  
First, its accounting board regulates the placement of transactions on financial statements 
and issues professional certifications for the Islamic banking industry.  Second, it has a 
shari’a board comprising 17 religious scholars whose role is to unify the findings issued 
by the shari’a boards of individual institutions.  The AAOIFI board determines the 
shari’a compliance of new products, and the members implement the rulings in their 
banks.188  Although the board has issued a number of accounting standards since its 
inception, they tend to be only adaptations of the International Accounting Standards 
pertaining to disclosure.189  Additionally, the AAOIFI is only a source of credibility, 
having no powers of enforcement.  Only eight countries consider the AAOIFI standards 
as mandatory, though many other institutions use them, and Malaysia has its own 
regulatory agency, the IFSB, which was established under the guidance of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).190  The IMF took steps in 2002 to standardize the 
industry by sponsoring the IFSB, which serves as the general secretary of the AAOIFI.191 
The IIRA, which began operation in July, 2005, uses the AAOIFI accounting 
standards as the basis by which it examines an institution’s shari’a compliance.  Not 
intending to compete with other regulatory agencies, it focuses on the likelihood of 
default by examining fiduciary risk.  Such a risk assessment endeavors to instill 
confidence and acceptability of new products in the Islamic financial industry.  The IIFM 
was established in 2001 to tackle the issue of liquidity management in the Islamic 
 financial services industry.  The lack of an interbank Islamic money market requires 
Islamic banks to maintain a greater degree of liquidity than conventional banks, affecting 
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competitiveness.  To counter this weakness the LMC was established under the IIFM to 
give Islamic banks an option for short-term liquidity instruments.  It operates by 
securitizing tangible long-term assets, issuing sukuk against these assets in order to be 
shari’a compliant.  The LMC established a consortium of liquidity providers to create a 
secondary market for its products.  Additionally, it utilizes an SPV to bridge the asset-
rich conventional institutions with the Islamic banks, not only securitizing the assets, but 
also ensuring their shari’a compliance.  The GCIBFI is focused on advancing the nascent 
Islamic banking industry, addressing misconceptions and other challenges through 
developing strategic alliances and partnerships.  Finally, the shari’a supervisory boards 
of individual Islamic financial institutions ensure shari’a compliance to sustain depositor 
confidence, a necessary ingredient for financial stability.  The AAOIFI is working to 
standardize the basic rules that would govern these boards.192 
The Islamic financial architecture will only be effective if these institutions 
consolidate their operations in order to provide an overarching regulatory framework for 
the entire Islamic financial services industry.  If such a consolidation were combined with 
international standards of best practices a financial system could be established that is 
more efficient, stable, and equitable.193 
C. ISLAMIC BANKING AND ISLAMISM 
As discussed in the chapter on the evolution of Islamic banking, an alliance 
developed between the ulama and the wealthy Islamic bankers that brought life to many 
sidelined shari’a scholars and encouraged many Muslims to use Islamic banks.  In 
addition to being a marketing win for the Islamic bankers for whom the ulama are 
essentially working, the ulama that have hired on with Islamic banks are reaping societal 
and financial benefits, enjoying greater respectability and income that far exceeds their 
compensation as religious scholars.194  Such is the demand for these shari’a experts that 
the lack of qualified experts to sit on shari’a boards is slowing growth of Islamic 
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financial products.195  However, the change in lifestyle that the increased wealth has 
allowed these fortunate members of the ulama to enjoy has drawn criticism from those 
not recruited, accusing the more fortunate scholars as being tools of the bankers and 
making liberal interpretations of shari’a to fit financial needs.  Ironically, most Islamist 
activists now tend to ally themselves with these critical, non-aligned ulama.  In line with 
financiers trying to avoid politics, the bankers have had to walk a fine line when choosing 
Islamic scholars, not wanting to alienate potential customers by picking ones that are 
government-sponsored, at the same time not wanting to choose overly-Islamist ulama 
that might cause conflict with an unpredictable authoritarian government.196   
Even though Islamic banking has endeavored to avoid extremists on both sides, 
its alliance with the ulama has legitimized parts of the Islamic movement in many 
Muslim countries, especially when Islamic banks use “moderate” Islamists.  Such 
relationships have actually provided a kind of political space for the moderate Islamist 
movement, giving these moderate Islamists a peaceful haven, such as the cases in Egypt 
and Jordan, improving their relations with their governments.  Many of these Islamists 
have abandoned Sayyid Qutb’s all or nothing mantra and embraced a more gradual 
approach to Islamizing the society.  Governments approved of the absorption of these 
“reconciliatory reformists” by Islamic banks under the rubric of an allied ulama, creating 
a new power center that comprises a segment of the ulama, Islamic financiers, moderate 
Islamists, and professionals and bureaucrats that make up part of the secularist 
intelligentsia.  This alliance has produced two significant socio-political achievements: a 
partial implementation of shari’a and the gradual moderation of the main Islamist 
movements. 
The authoritarian states of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) tend to be 
more open economically than politically.  Consequently, Islamic financiers have greater 
access to the government and business elites than other Islamists, enjoying a greater 
degree of autonomy than political parties.  While states may permit Islamic banking as a 
means of improving legitimacy with its Muslim constituency, the bridging capability of 
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Islamic financiers between the state and businesses could help precipitate social and 
economic change in these illiberal countries.  Islamic bankers tend to promote a more 
“politically neutral form of Islamism” that has a greater chance of being tolerated than the 
more militant forms associated with the Islamist movement.197  In spite of these 
possibilities, the Islamic banking experience has been different for all countries, 
especially in the Gulf.  While seen as a force of moderation, it has been used as a tool for 
advancing Islamism, though a socially-focused, non-violent form.  The popularity of 
Islamic banking with the general Muslim populace may find the shari’a-compliant 
business practices more attractive than the interest-driven conventional banking.198 
Islamic banks can foster the spread of Islamism by providing job opportunities to 
religious youths whose education and cultural background might have limited their 
opportunities in the corporate world and funneling a portion of their profits into religious 
education, publishing, and networking.199  More than mere profit-seekers, some Islamic 
bankers may see themselves as “agents of social renewal,” cleansing the economy, if not 
the entire social system, from secular influences.  Viewing riba as the source of such 
evils as injustice, corruption, inequality, poverty, and discontent in capitalist and socialist 
economies, by offering an Islamic alternative these Islamic bankers feel that they are 
fomenting a fairer and more egalitarian society.200  Such is the case of Islamic banking in 
Kuwait. 
1. Kuwait Finance House 
The early Islamic financiers in the Gulf were often members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who sought to expand their influence through bank ownership, linking Islam 
with global capitalism.  The Kuwait Finance House (KFH) is an example of such efforts.  
Established in 1977, the KFH has grown to be the second largest bank in Kuwait, trailing 
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only the National Bank of Kuwait, whose influence extends into real estate and leads 
consumer lending.  As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the KFH has come to 
symbolize the Islamic movement in Kuwait, capitalizing on its links among businesses, 
government, and charities to protect and further Islamist interests at the same time that its 
Islamist ties protect and expand the bank.  The KFH has enjoyed this success through 
considerable government support, “a concrete expression of the de facto alliance between 
the ruling family and the Islamic movement,” brought about as a counter to the Arab 
nationalist movement.201 
The KFH’s influence extends beyond the economic, however, promoting an 
Islamic social agenda and overall Islamic lifestyle - Islamic tenets in the workplace and 
gender segregation in society, for example.  Additionally, KFH has become a center for 
Islamic charities to deposit their funds, going so far as to advertise its services for such 
purposes and making donations to numerous charities.  The KFH has been the object of 
added scrutiny due to the suspicious political leanings of some of these charities and the 
lack of oversight by Kuwait’s Central Bank over the KFH.  In spite of a law passed in 
April 2003 that was to limit KFH’s activities and bring it under the auspices of the 
Central Bank, the KFH is still free to invest in commercial activities up to a Central 
Bank-designated ceiling, and the exact nature of the regulation was left undefined.  
Overall, the KFH’s methods of inclusion of Kuwait’s Bedouin and middle class in the 
countries economic activities has brought about an Islamization of public life that will in 
turn secure the demand for Islamic financial services.202 
Islamic finance garners support to the broader Islamist agenda in a two-pronged 
approach.  The philosophical argument for Islamic economics only persuades, while a 
successful Islamic bank persuades and builds political pressure, not only demonstrating 
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of Islamism’s power.  The result is a compounded pressure to support Islamism, altering 
public opinion to the point that opponents practice a form of self-censorship, ultimately 
weakening the anti-Islamist resistance.203 
On the other hand, Islamic finance has moderating effects, the majority of its 
practitioners being thought of as “Muslim reformists,” similar to the Islamists in their 
aspiration to increase the role of Islam in daily life, but lacking in their commitment to 
political mobilization.  Bankers, as a rule, attempt to avoid, or at least give the 
appearance of avoiding, political engagement or activity.  Moreover, most would favor 
the neoliberal economic reform of the Washington Consensus as Islamic financial 
instruments require the financial transparency and accountability that are the goals of 
structural adjustment programs.  The current investing climate of the developing 
countries that practice Islamic finance is not ideal, especially for equity financing which 
accounts for only five percent of the current assets of Islamic banks.204  Islamic financing 
in Jordan exemplifies the way Islamic banks often must balance competing interests. 
2. Jordan Islamic Bank 
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) gained significant influence in Jordan in 1970 
when it supported the monarchy’s expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization.   
Earning a semi-official status, the group created many new charitable and social 
organizations in Jordan and began discussing the feasibility of establishing Islamic banks.  
Sami Harmoud, a Jordanian economist with nearly 20 years experience at the Jordanian 
National Bank, was convinced of the merits of an interest-free financial system and began 
working toward establishing an Islamic bank in the 1970s.  He established a Preparatory 
Committee for the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB), choosing ulama that would be acceptable 
to the monarchy and the general masses, ultimately obtaining a license to begin 
operations in March of 1979.  Although Harmoud avoided shari’a scholars that  
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might be too closely linked to Islamist groups, the MB played important political and 
financial roles, including a secondary role in the bank’s leadership and decision-
making.205 
The MB never adopted the JIB as an institution of their movement, i.e. using it as 
a means to advance its Islamist agenda, and has had less influence over its operation in 
the following years.  The MB was also uninvolved in the establishment of the Arab 
Islamic Bank (AIB) in Jordan.  Although the Islamists have touted the success of these 
banks as evidence that Islam is relevant for inclusion in all aspects of modern life, they 
feel that the banks could do more in fulfilling basic social needs and that it uses interest 
in its operations under an Islamic veneer.  The view of the JIB by the non-Islamists has 
also tarnished during the mid-1990s, the assumption being that the JIB is an institution of 
the MB.  Accordingly, the JIB has walked a fine line, trying to stay close enough to 
Islamist elements to not lost its Islamic credentials, but not so close as to attract 
government scrutiny.  In supporting this course of action, the monarchy is missing an 
opportunity to moderate the more vocal elements of the Islamist movement by giving it a 
chance to frame the legal and regulatory environment that binds Islamic banks and 
precludes their involvement in state business.  An alliance between the Islamic financiers 
and Islamist activists would accompany a more politically liberal environment, 
incentivize the latter to reduce their demands on the state, and foster a forum of 
cooperation and coexistence.  Such a partnership could foster a process of moderation 
that fosters the development of civil-society institutions that could lead to a peaceful 
democratization of Jordan.206 
While its apparent from the previous discussion that Islamic banking has its 
weaknesses, these are primarily economic in nature and do not pose a security threat.  
However, Islamists are involved in the industry, and though they seem focused primarily 
on local change, their published ideology tends to be anti-western.  If Islamists with a 
more extremist views were to come to power, their belief in the immorality of man’s 
involvement in governance could undermine democracy.  The Muslim Brotherhood has  
                                                 
205 Malley, 191-196. 
206 Ibid., 196-199, 207-212. 
 72
embraced Islamic banking as a part of their overall scheme of Islamizing society; 
fortunately their motives seem to be more socially focused, at least for now.  The 















In spite of the cases of certain Islamic banks being involved in some way in 
financing terrorist activity, there is little proof that the Islamic banking industry is 
connected to terrorism any more than are conventional banks.  Furthermore, the recent 
surge in the Islamic financial sector is due to the growth in petroleum-related wealth, a 
Muslim piety, and portfolio diversification.  Islamist groups, particularly the Muslim 
Brotherhood, have played an active role in the spread of Islamic banking, but the industry 
seems to be moderating many would-be extremists and increasing the financial 
opportunities for much of Islamic society.  This does not mean, however, that there are 
not aspects of the industry that should be monitored.  Like conventional banks, Islamic 
banks must be wary of and report transactions that seem out of the ordinary or are for 
nefarious intent.   
The authoritarian states of the Middle East and North Africa tend to be more open 
economically than politically.  Consequently, Islamic financiers have greater access to 
the government and business elites than other Islamists, enjoying a greater degree of 
autonomy than political parties.  While states may permit Islamic banking as a means of 
improving legitimacy with its Muslim constituency, the bridging capability of Islamic 
financiers between the state and businesses could help precipitate social and economic 
change in these illiberal countries.  Islamic bankers tend to promote a more “politically 
neutral form of Islamism” that has a greater chance of being tolerated than the more 
militant forms associated with the Islamist movement.207  The Islamic banking 
experience has been different for all countries, especially in the Persian Gulf.  While seen 
as a force of moderation, it has been used as a tool for advancing Islamism, though a 
socially-focused, non-violent form.  The popularity of Islamic banking with the general 
Muslim populace is due to shari’a-compliant business practices being more attractive 
than interest-driven conventional banking.208 
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Contrary to the idea of Islamic banking’s nefarious connections, Malaysia has 
used this new financial sector as a means of providing jobs to many of its Islamists who 
were graduates in religious studies, turning them “away from the path of revolution.”209  
This was also the case in many parts of the Middle East.  Although groups like the 
Muslim Brotherhood used Islamic banks as a tool for advancing their Islamic agenda, 
there is little evidence to connect the more socially-concerned agendas or the actual 
deposited funds with terrorism.  Additionally, the more salutary effects of giving the 
potentially-radicalized Islamists financial opportunities and involving the traditionally 
disenfranchised members of society in the modern financial system more than outweigh 
the anecdotal suspected involvement of Islamic banks in financing terrorism.  This being 
said, one must be aware that the forces of capitalism seem to be tempering an Islamist 
ideology that tends to be anti-western. 
A synergy that has developed between the rising Islamic capitalists in the Muslim 
world and the ulama could grow into one that is capable of persuading Muslims to turn 
their backs on the extremist theories of jihad.  While not “transforming the spirit of 
puritan Islam,” Islamic banking is providing a pious alternative to devout Muslims “who 
may prefer to forsake politics for business.”  One could argue that Islamic banking is a 
means of enfranchisement for the previously disenfranchised Muslim who may have been 
attracted to a more radical form of Islamism as an outlet for his economic, if not political, 
grievances.  Islamic financiers may be taking the first step toward building the civil 
societies necessary for building democratic institutions in authoritarian states. 210   
The United States should abandon its unfounded fears of Islamic banking and its 
supposed ties to terrorism and do all that it can to bring this nascent financial industry 
into the international system.  As a means of leverage, it could alter its laws to make 
Islamic banking possible in the United States in return for greater scrutiny of operations 
abroad.  The zakat collection must be more closely monitored to ensure that the collected 
funds are flowing to legitimate charities that do not support terrorism.  Additionally, 
although hawala is not inherent to Islamic banking, most of its operations take place in 
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Islamic countries.  Islamic banks could assist in curbing this system by offering low-cost 
wire transfers that are competitive with hawala.  With Islamic finance being relatively 
new to the world of modern finance, there are many areas that could be leveraged to the 
benefit of the United States and Islamic banks, advancing into developing regions free of 
an Islamist agenda. 
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